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ABSTRACT 
 
The integration of dual-systems processing and cognitive bias in cognitive 
vulnerability to anxiety: Investigations of spider fear 
 
Allison Jane Ouimet 
 
Concordia University, 2013 
 
A recent model of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety proposes that discrepant 
findings related to the time-course of attentional responding to threat in anxious samples 
may be explained by individual differences in associative and rule-based processing. 
Specifically, stronger fear-relevant associations and maladaptive rule-based processing 
are hypothesized to contribute jointly to impaired disengagement from threat. The current 
program of research was designed as a test of this model within the context of spider 
fear/phobia. In Study 1, unselected participants completed measures of spider-fear 
associations (Go/No-go Association Task; GNAT), attention bias (Visual Search Task; 
VST), and self-reported spider fear and avoidance (Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; FSQ; 
& Spider Phobia Questionnaire; SPQ). Results demonstrated that participants were 
slower on disengagement trials of the VST compared to engagement trials. Surprisingly, 
higher levels of spider fear/avoidance were related to faster engagement with and 
disengagement from threat; stronger spider-fear associations were related to reduced 
disengagement accuracy. Moreover, an indirect relationship between spider-fear 
associations and reported spider fear/avoidance via disengagement accuracy was 
observed, such that stronger spider-fear associations predicted reduced disengagement 
accuracy, which subsequently predicted higher scores on the FSQ and SPQ. In Study 2, 
participants were randomly assigned into 1 of 2 conditions, wherein they either 
repeatedly negated the threat value of spiders or repeatedly reappraised spider stimuli as 
  iv 
safe. As in Study 1, they completed the VST, FSQ, and SPQ. Again, all participants were 
slower on disengagement trials of the VST than on engagement trials. Attentional 
responding was unrelated to condition or to reported spider fear/avoidance. Moreover, 
there was no effect of condition on FSQ/SPQ scores. Exploratory analyses conducted 
within a restricted subsample of participants who obtained reasonable accuracy rates on 
the VST demonstrated that assignment to the negate condition predicted increased 
reported spider fear/avoidance. This relationship, however, was not mediated by 
attentional bias, contrary to hypotheses. For both studies, methodological limitations 
were noted, particularly with respect to the use of the VST. The utility of assessing fear 
with both indirect and direct measures is discussed, as well as theoretical and clinical 
implications for cognitive models of anxiety disorders and their associated treatments.  
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Fear and anxiety are normal and adaptive reactions to potentially threatening 
stimuli. Identification and appraisal of threats to survival are vital to the activation of 
safety-oriented processes, whether they are cognitive, affective, physiological and/or 
behavioural (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). The importance of fear-based emotions in daily life is 
highlighted when imagining encountering a bear in the woods, realizing that an exam for 
which one has not studied takes place the following day, or swerving a car to avoid 
hitting a large pothole. Pathological anxiety, however, occurs when these resources are 
activated in situations where threats to survival are minimal, or when the safety-based 
reaction is exaggerated (e.g., Barlow, 2002). Clark and Beck (2010) contend that clinical 
anxiety disorders can be differentiated from non-clinical anxiety states by five 
characteristics:  
(1) Dysfunctional cognition, wherein the perception of threat is not confirmed by 
objective observation of the situations;  
(2) Impaired functioning, both in terms of reaction to coping with a perceived threat 
(i.e., freezing, paralysis, or counterproductive response), and more pervasive 
impairments in occupational, social, routine, and relational functioning; 
(3) Persistence, in that anxiety occurs not only upon exposure to a perceived threat 
but arises in anticipation of a possible feared event and endures even when the 
danger has passed;  
(4) False alarms, wherein intense fear reactions occur in the absence (or minimal 
occurrence) or threat; and 
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(5)  Stimulus hypersensitivity, which refers to the generalizability of fear to stimuli 
that may be only tangentially related to the original feared stimulus. For example, 
fear of dogs may develop, over time, from the avoidance of unleashed dogs to the 
complete alteration of transit routes to avoid walking through any park or green 
space where dogs may have been at one time (pp. 6-7). 
Although the anxiety disorders share similar underpinnings in terms of both vulnerability 
and general framework (i.e., pathological fear), they are often differentiated by the 
specific content of their fears, accompanying symptoms, and idiosyncratic cognitive 
conceptualizations (e.g., Clark & Beck, 2010; Mineka, Watson, & L. A. Clark, 1998; 
Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). Indeed, these models are often quite complex, because they 
represent an attempt to parsimoniously explain the contribution(s) of a multitude of 
factors to the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders across the general 
population. Whereas models of specific phobia vary in their focus on evolutionary, 
conditioning, developmental, and cognitive factors (see Coelho & Purkis, 2009, for a 
review), specific phobia offers a simple yet elegant framework through which the 
characteristics of pathological anxiety can be understood and tested.  
Specific Phobia  
Specific Phobia is described as an intense fear of a specific object or situation, 
which causes persistent avoidance as well as significant impairment or distress (APA, 
2000). Phobias typically fall into one of a few general categories: animal (e.g., spider, 
snake), natural environment (e.g., heights, water), situational (e.g., enclosed places), and 
blood-injection-injury (Antony & Barlow, 2002). Other common phobias include intense 
fear of clowns, choking, vomiting, space, loud sounds, and certain flowers or plants.  
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Current cognitive-behavioural models posit learned cue-consequence expectations 
as integral to the development of specific phobia. In other words, the appraisal of a 
certain stimulus (i.e., stimulus hypersensitivity) as safe or dangerous (i.e., false alarms) in 
response to biological or environmental influences, the attribution(s) (i.e., dysfunctional 
cognitions) made regarding bodily sensations, the perceived control over both the 
situation and the bodily reaction, and the behavioural strategies (i.e., impaired 
functioning) used to reduce anxiety all play a role in the development and maintenance of 
persistent (i.e., persistence) phobia (e.g, Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995). Indeed, 
the way in which internal and external stimuli, safety resources, coping abilities, and 
consequences of one’s actions are processed, determine the extent to which an individual 
will exhibit pathological fear and anxiety. 
Information Processing in Anxiety 
As originally outlined by Beck (1967), the core tenet of cognitive theory is that 
individuals process information in a manner that is consistent with their views of 
themselves, the world, and the future. This contention is well-represented in 
contemporary models of anxiety disorders which position information processing, 
whether in terms of specific biases in perception, attention, interpretation, and memory, 
or considered more broadly as “core beliefs”, as critical, and indeed primary, in our 
understanding of the aetiology, maintenance, and treatment of clinical (and non-clinical) 
anxiety (c.f., Clark & Beck, 2010). Specifically, anxious individuals have been shown to 
process threat-relevant material in a biased manner via exaggerated perception (e.g., 
Vasey et al., 2012), preferential attention (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), 
negative interpretation (e.g., Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005), and enhanced recall (e.g., 
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Radomsky & Rachman, 1999). Moreover, the interaction among these processes has been 
highlighted as particularly important (Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). Specifically, 
attention to threatening stimuli is hypothesized to influence the appraisal of said stimuli 
by activating relevant associations in memory, which are likely linked in a biased 
manner. Moreover, threatening appraisals of stimuli are posited to enhance vigilance to 
said stimuli, and strengthen biased memorial links. Because detection of a given stimulus 
is necessary to “kick-start” the cycle (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011), 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of threat-relevant attention may be particularly 
important in the investigation of information processing in anxiety.  
Attention Bias in Anxiety Disorders 
Although research has consistently reported evidence in support of a threat-
relevant attentional bias among anxious samples (recent meta-analytic effect size: d = 
.45) (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007), 
inconsistent findings have been observed with respect to the time-course of responding to 
threatening stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Ouimet et al., 2009). Indeed, 
models focusing on biases at the stages of orientation, when an individual’s attention is 
first drawn to a stimulus (e.g., <30 ms), engagement, when an individual continues to 
attend to a stimulus (e.g., 30-500 ms), disengagement, when an individual shifts attention 
away from a stimulus (e.g., 500-1000 ms), and avoidance, when an individual continues 
to attend away from a stimulus (e.g., >500 ms) have each received consistent empirical 
support (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Vanvolsem, & De Houwer, 2007; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, 
& Merckelbach, 1995). However, a substantial minority of research findings have also 
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failed to find biases at each stage of processing (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001, studies 1 & 2; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). 
Moreover, the theoretical and mechanistic underpinnings of each model are somewhat in 
conflict. For example, whereas Fox et al. (2001) contend that observed attentional biases 
among anxious samples are driven by impaired (or slowed) disengagement from 
threatening stimuli, Koster et al. (2007) posit that anxious individuals show an initial 
orientation bias towards threat, but subsequently demonstrate avoidance of the same 
material (i.e., vigilance-avoidance models). Because the nature of attention bias varies 
across anxiety disorders [e.g., attention to internal representation of the self in social 
anxiety disorder (e.g., Schultz & Heimberg, 2008) vs. attention to physiological 
sensations in panic disorder (e.g., Ehlers & Breuer, 1995) vs. attention to external danger 
cues in specific phobia (Cisler, Ries, & Widner, 2007)], the stages of attention may be 
best illustrated by examining findings within a particular disorder. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, spider fear has been chosen as a model for more complex anxiety 
disorders because the feared stimulus is specific and circumscribed, allowing for a finer-
grained examination of related biases. 
  Attention bias in spider fear/phobia. Threat-relevant attention biases have often 
been measured using the emotional-Stroop (e-Stroop; Gotlib & McCann, 1984), dot 
probe (MacLeod et al., 1986), and visual search paradigms. The e-Stroop consists of a 
series of threatening and neutral word-stimuli printed in coloured ink. Participants are 
asked to name the colour of the word while ignoring its valence. Longer word-naming 
latencies are inferred as indications of increased attention to, distraction by, and/or 
interference of the meaning of the word. Research has demonstrated that individuals with 
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spider fear are slower to name the colours of spider-related words and/or pictures 
compared to neutral, positive, and/or generally threatening (i.e., fear-relevant, but not 
feared, per se) stimuli (Chen, Lewin, & Craske, 1996; Lavy & van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, 
van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993; van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, & de Jong, 1997). 
Additionally, spider fearful groups have exhibited significantly greater interference for 
spider-related stimuli than have non-anxious groups and/or groups with other anxiety 
disorders/concerns (Kindt & Brosschot, 1997; Lavy et al., 1993; Martin, Horder, & Jones, 
1992; Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 2008, when participants were primed with 
exposure to a dead spider; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & 
Trezise, 1986). Some studies have also demonstrated a reduction in e-Stroop interference 
following behavioural treatment (Côté & Bouchard, 2005; Lavy et al., 1993; Lavy & van 
den Hout, 1993; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997b; van den Hout et al., 1997; Watts et al., 
1986). In contrast to consistent support for a spider-relevant cognitive bias, some research 
has failed to demonstrate significantly greater interference scores for individuals with 
spider fear compared to control participants (Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Kolassa, Musial, 
Mohr, Trippe, & Miltner, 2005; Kolassa, Musial, S. Kolassa, & Miltner, 2006; Olatunji et 
al., 2008, when participants were not primed with exposure to a dead spider).  
Originally developed by Posner, Snyder, and Davidson (1980), the dot-probe 
paradigm was adapted for use in psychopathological research by MacLeod et al. (1986). 
For the dot-probe task, pairs of stimuli differing in valence (typically threatening and 
neutral) are presented on the computer screen for brief periods of time. Subsequently, a 
small probe replaces either the negative (i.e., congruent trials) or neutral (i.e., incongruent 
trials) stimulus, and participants are asked to indicate with a button press either the 
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presence, location, or nature of the probe. Threat-relevant attention bias is inferred from 
slower responses on incongruent trials in combination with faster responses on congruent 
trials. Results from experiments using the dot-probe paradigm are consistent with those 
documented in the e-Stroop literature: individuals with high levels of spider fear 
preferentially attend to spider stimuli compared to neutral stimuli (Lipp & Derakshan, 
2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Vrijsen, Fleurkens, Nieuwboer, & Rinck, 2009). 
Moreover, although attention biases for phylogenetically prepared fear-relevant stimuli 
such as spiders, snakes, and angry faces are typical of unselected populations (see Ohman 
& Mineka, 2001, for a review), biases for spider stimuli tend to be more pronounced in 
spider fearful samples (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Osinsky et al., 
2008). Some research, however, has failed to find such an effect (Wenzel & Holt, 1999).  
Although research has generally demonstrated a spider-related attention bias in 
individuals with spider fear (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), there has been some argument 
about when these attention biases occur, and which stage of information processing is 
most important in the conferral of cognitive vulnerability to phobia. For example, two 
separate studies that used both masked and unmasked stimuli within an e-Stroop 
paradigm found evidence for biases in engagement (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997a; van 
den Hout et al., 1997), but only one demonstrated preferential processing of spider 
stimuli at initial orientation (Van den Hout et al., 1997). Additionally, results presented 
by Osinsky et al. (2008) suggest that spider-related attentional biases may include 
elements of both engagement (at presentation durations of 1250 ms) and avoidance (at 
presentation durations of 2000 ms). Research by Mogg and Bradley (2006) demonstrated 
initial orientation biases (200 ms presentation durations) among high, but not low spider-
 8 
   
 
fearful participants, but found no evidence of similar biases at presentation durations of 
500 and 2000 ms.  
 As such, research remains equivocal over whether threat-relevant attention biases 
occur as a result of “automatic” orientation, enhanced engagement, impaired 
disengagement, intentional avoidance, or some combination of these processes. It 
appears, therefore, that although the extant literature largely supports the theory that all 
individuals show a tendency to preferentially process phylogenetically prepared stimuli 
with an enhanced effect seen in fearful participants, the evidence varies with respect to 
what mechanism underlies such a bias (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). According to Ouimet 
et al., (2009), this variability may be attributable to individual differences in associative 
and rule-based processing. 
Dual-Systems Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology 
In recent years, several dual-systems models have been advanced within the 
cognitive and social psychology literature (Carlston, 2010; Forgas, 2000; Lieberman, 
2003; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These models 
share their focus on two separate, but interactive cognitive systems – often referred to as 
associative and rule-based – that operate jointly to problem-solve, make decisions, make 
social judgments, regulate emotions, and influence attitudes. In other words, these 
systems are posited as mechanisms underlying a wide variety of cognitive, emotional, 
and behavioural processes.  
Although several different dual-systems models have been presented to account 
for various social and cognitive phenomena, they tend to share certain basic tenets. For 
example, whereas Sloman (1996) argued for two distinct systems of reasoning, Smith and 
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DeCoster (2000) focused on two systems directing encoding of information and memory 
retrieval. Both accounts of human cognition rest on similar assumptions. Specifically, 
associative and rule-based systems are distinguished by their principles of operation, 
rather than by their characteristics. The associative system operates by rapid activation of 
concepts associated in memory (e.g., links between “women” and “weak”); whereas the 
rule-based system evaluates the subjective truth-value or accuracy of such an association 
via syllogistic inferences (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) . 
This differentiation forms the foundation of dual-systems models of emotion regulation 
(Forgas, Ciarrochi, & Moylan, 2000; Forgas, 2000), memory in posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), decision-making (e.g., Seymour Epstein, 
1990; Fazio, 1990; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992), social behaviour (Strack & Deutsch, 
2004), cognitive vulnerability to depression (Beevers, 2005), attitude change (Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2006), the development of addictive behaviours (Wiers et al., 2007), and 
most recently, cognitive bias in anxiety disorders (Ouimet et al., 2009).  
Associative System  
Information processing within the associative system occurs via the relatively 
quick activation of networks of associated representations. According to Sloman (1996), 
the associative system organizes mental representations to the extent that they are similar 
and temporally contiguous. These associations result in predictions and inferences 
without regard for their underlying causes or mechanisms. In other words, the associative 
system operates like a statistician, providing a quick response based on readily available 
data. The subjective truth or accuracy of the data, however, is not analyzed via the 
associative system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). A simple example involves the activation 
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of stereotypes associated with gender, race, age, or other obvious physical characteristics. 
When one sees a woman, traits such as warmth, caring, sensitivity, and timidity may 
come immediately to mind without an explicit appraisal of this particular woman’s 
personality. Furthermore, the associative system is described as a pattern-completion 
mechanism, wherein perceptual cues (e.g., long hair, high-pitched voice) retrieve 
associated representations from memory based on similarity and temporal contiguity to 
complete a pattern (e.g., woman), thereby activating other associated concepts such as 
high-strung, without examining the veracity of such an association (e.g., Smith & 
DeCoster, 1999). 
According to Smith and DeCoster (1999, 2000), associative learning is also 
distinct from rule-based learning. They contend that representations in the associative 
system are learned slowly through repeated events that link two representations together. 
This can occur both because of similarity and temporal contiguity, as well as through 
repeated use of rules. For example, when first learning mathematics, we may use rules 
(e.g., counting fingers) to find the sum of two and two. Over time, however, the 
calculation “2+2” becomes associated with the response “4”, and the process moves from 
rule-based to associative.  
Simple and complex behaviour are also differentially directed by the associative 
and rule-based systems (Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Behavioural 
schemata are believed to be the driving force behind behaviours directed by the 
associative system. These schemata develop over time because of similarity and temporal 
contiguity between situations, stimuli, emotions, consequences, and motor 
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representations. Schemata are activated through spreading activation, which may occur 
due to perceptual input, internal drive states, or rule-based processes. 
Rule-Based System  
Rather than simply making a prediction based on available data, as in the 
associative system, processing within the rule-based system is believed to be productive, 
in that it can always generate new responses by combining extant rules (Sloman, 1996). 
Whereas mental representations in the associative system are linked due to their 
similarity and temporal contiguity, relationships within the rule-based system are 
conceptualized as connections among semantic terms with associated truth values (Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004). Although these representations are likely retrieved from the 
associative system, their examination through rule-based processes (i.e., syllogistic 
inferences) enables their connections within the latter system to be plastic in comparison 
to their less flexible links within the associative system. Furthermore, the rule-based 
decision-making process functions by weighing the value (i.e., true or false) and 
probability of potential outcomes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
This system is proposed to operate more slowly than does the associative system, 
and may be understood best as a “problem-solving” structure. For example, the 
computation “(376 x 523) / √9214” is unlikely to be associated in one’s mind with the 
response “36092.0381” (although this association may be possible with repeated 
exposure to this problem and its solution). Rather, one will likely have to employ 
complex rules to solve the equation. 
Behaviour derived through rule-based processing is conceptualized as the result of 
a decision process, rather than a simple association between an event and a behavioural 
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schema (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This system “chooses” behaviour by integrating 
information related to the value and probability of its consequences. Habitual responses 
generated by the associative system can be overcome through rational decision-making 
regulated by the rule-based system (Lieberman, 2003). Importantly, however, adequate 
motivation and cognitive capacity are necessary for rule-based processing to take place 
and guide behaviour.  
Interaction Between the Two Systems  
With a few exceptions, the various models appear to concur that these two 
systems of processing operate simultaneously, though the associative system is believed 
to act more quickly (e.g., Sloman, 1996). However, associative processing is not likely 
terminated prior to onset (or completion) of rule-based processing. Rather, rule-based 
processing is posited to continually make use of associative activation, thereby resulting 
in continuous activation of both systems until the matter at hand is resolved (S. Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). For example, in the case of a semi-skilled typist, associative processing 
may dictate motor movements for words consisting of letters only; however, when a 
sentence requires less commonly used symbols such as “$” and “*”, rule-based 
processing may be necessary to complete the sentence. When the systems come up with 
competing responses, external factors such as motivation, arousal, and cognitive capacity 
may dictate which system “wins the race” (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 1999).  
When behavioural schemata and emotions activated via the associative system are 
incompatible with knowledge and intentions of the rule-based system, self-regulatory 
conflicts may occur (Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Because the 
rule-based system typically activates behavioural schemata stored in the associative 
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system following a decision, self-regulatory conflicts are believed to result in the 
activation of two (or more) incompatible behavioural schemata. Importantly, this dual 
activation may clarify inconsistencies in the anxiety literature with respect to the various 
stages of cognitive processing. Vigilance-avoidance models (e.g., Koster et al., 2006), for 
example, may reflect relatively “automatic” orienting and engaging with threatening 
material dictated by the quicker associative system, counteracted by a slower decision by 
the rule-based system to avoid threatening material with the goal of reducing negative 
affective states. As such, concepts arising from dual-systems accounts of social and 
cognitive phenomena may help to explain and resolve some of the inconsistencies 
observed in the literature pertaining to the role of information processing biases in the 
aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. 
A Multi-Process Model of Cognitive Vulnerability to Anxiety 
 According to Ouimet et al.'s (2009) multi-process model of cognitive 
vulnerability to anxiety, cognitive biases at each stage of processing (i.e., orientation, 
engagement, disengagement, avoidance, interpretation) are at least partially dictated by 
individual differences in processing by the associative and rule-based systems. Moreover, 
these biases are implicated in the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. 
Specifically, exposure to a threat-relevant stimulus (e.g., spider) is theorized to activate 
both systems simultaneously. Strong stimulus-fear links within the associative system are 
proposed to enhance both rapid orientation to and continued engagement with the 
stimulus. Continued engagement (and therefore, continued activation of fear-relevant 
links within the associative system), in turn, is posited to influence appraisal of the 
stimulus by the rule-based system. As such, although interpretation is often considered a 
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rule-based or “controlled/strategic” process (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & 
Mathews, 1991; Teachman, 2005), Ouimet et al. (2009) contend that interpretation is 
influenced (i.e., biased) by information activated via the associative system. Indeed, a 
wealth of evidence supports the existence of rapid biased threat appraisal occurring 
earlier (i.e., “automatically”) than would be expected for a purely rule-based process 
(Clark & Beck, 2010, pp. 69-72). This interaction between associative and rule-based 
systems represents a positive feedback loop, wherein increased activation within the 
associative system is proposed to lead to enhanced engagement with fear-relevant stimuli, 
which in turn may result in persistent activation of stimulus-fear associations, biased 
appraisal, and continued attention (i.e., impaired disengagement). 
 Under ideal conditions of motivation, working memory capacity, and arousal, the 
rule-based system may override the “attend” feedback loop, either by deactivating the 
fear-relevant associations or by making a behavioural decision to actively disengage 
attention from the stimulus (Ouimet et al., 2009). According to Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006), the rule-based system may attempt to accomplish this via 
(in)validation of activated links in one of three ways:  (1) the threat value of the stimulus 
may be affirmed (e.g., “the spider is very dangerous and might harm me”); (2) the threat 
value of the stimulus may be negated (e.g., “the spider is not dangerous”); or (3) the 
threat value of the stimulus may be reappraised as safe (e.g., “the spider is friendly and 
keeps my house free of other insects”). Both affirmation and negation are hypothesized to 
contribute to impaired disengagement via response conflicts between the associative and 
rule-based systems, whereas reappraisal is expected to deactivate associative links 
between fear and the relevant stimulus, thereby discontinuing attention to the stimulus 
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and weakening links over time (Ouimet et al., 2009). Indeed, research has demonstrated 
that repeated negation of gender stereotypes resulted in the ironic increase of such 
associations (e.g., women-weak); whereas reappraisal of such stereotypes resulted in the 
consequent weakening of such associations (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & 
Strack, 2008). 
 The main implication of this model is that processing within both the associative 
and rule-based systems is believed to contribute to self-regulatory conflicts, which may 
drive observed discrepancies across experiments examining the time-course of attentional 
responding to threat. Specifically, individual differences in strength of associations and 
use of rule-based validation processes are hypothesized to dictate the point at which 
individuals are able to disengage from threatening stimuli.  
The current studies were designed as a preliminary test of the multi-process model 
of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009). Although this model applies to 
anxiety more broadly, it lends itself well to investigation within the framework of spider 
fear. Two studies using contemporary methodologies were conducted to examine the 
extent to which associative and rule-based systems influence impaired disengagement 
from spider-related stimuli, and subsequently, impact upon phobic symptoms among 
individuals falling within a broad range of spider fear levels. The results have potentially 
important implications for our understanding of the role played by cognitive bias in the 
conferral of vulnerability to anxiety disorders, as well as for the development of effective 
psychological treatments. 
The first of these studies measured spider related associative fear networks using 
the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), and assessed its ability 
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to predict speed of disengagement from spider stimuli in a modified visual search 
paradigm and subsequent overt spider fear. The second study manipulated the way in 
which individuals appraised spider stimuli and assessed the effects of said manipulation 
on speed of attentional disengagement and subsequent spider fear.  
In Study 1, it was hypothesized that spider-fear associations would demonstrate 
an indirect relationship with increased reported spider fear via impaired disengagement, 
wherein stronger spider fear associations were hypothesized to predict slower 
disengagement from spider stimuli, which were hypothesized to subsequently predict 
higher levels of self-reported spider fear. In Study 2, it was hypothesized that individuals 
who repeatedly negated the threat value of spiders would show greater impaired 
disengagement from spider-related stimuli and, consequently, more self-reported spider 
fear than would individuals who repeatedly reappraised spider-related stimuli as safe.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPIDER FEAR ASSOCIATIONS, 
ATTENTIONAL DISENGAGEMENT AND SELF-REPORTED FEAR: A 
PRELIMINARY TEST OF A DUAL-SYSTEMS MODEL 
Although research has generally demonstrated a spider-related attention bias in 
individuals with spider fear (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), research remains equivocal over 
whether threat-relevant attention biases occur as a result of ‘automatic‘ orientation, 
enhanced engagement, or impaired disengagement processes.  Whereas orientation and 
engagement can be assessed separately via the use of subliminal and supraliminal 
stimulus presentations, respectively, disentangling enhanced engagement and impaired 
disengagement is more difficult using the standard e-Stroop and dot probe paradigms 
(e.g., Fox et al., 2001).  Some recent studies, therefore, have used visual search 
paradigms (e.g., Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005), wherein participants 
are presented with stimulus matrices and are asked to determine whether there is a 
discrepant stimulus among homogenous stimuli. Enhanced engagement with spider 
stimuli for example, is inferred from response times on trials where participants must 
identify a spider target among non-spider related distracters, whereas impaired 
disengagement is assessed on trials where participants must find a non-spider related 
target among spider related distracters.  
Several studies have demonstrated that unselected participants are quicker to find 
fear relevant (FR) stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders) among matrices of fear irrelevant (FI) 
stimuli (e.g., flowers, cats, fish) than they are to detect the presence of a FI target among 
matrices of FR distractors (e.g., Flykt, 2006). This interaction may represent either 
 18 
   
 
enhanced engagement with the FR stimuli (i.e., speeded detection of FR target among FI 
distractors), or impaired disengagement from the threat-relevant stimuli (i.e., slowed 
detection of FI target among FR distractors). In a modified visual search task, wherein 
both a target and distractor were presented within a matrix of unrelated stimuli, 
individuals were slower to detect the presence of either an FR or FI target if the distracter 
was FR (Lipp & Waters, 2007).  These results provide support for the contention that 
delayed disengagement may drive observed threat-relevant attention biases. 
Several researchers have investigated this hypothesis among spider and/or snake 
fearful samples using traditional visual search paradigms.  The majority of these studies 
found not only enhanced attention biases for FR stimuli (e.g., Rinck et al., 2005), but also 
an effect of specific fear, such that spider-fearful participants showed enhanced detection 
of, and distraction by, spider stimuli compared to snake stimuli, whereas snake fearful 
participants evidenced the opposite pattern (e.g., Soares, Esteves, & Flykt, 2009).  
Furthermore, results from experiments using the modified visual search paradigm are 
consistent with the theory that these effects are attributable to impaired disengagement 
from feared stimuli among fearful individuals (e.g, Lipp & Waters, 2007).   
 Although the extant literature largely supports the theory that individuals show a 
tendency to preferentially process phylogenetically prepared stimuli with an enhanced 
effect seen in fearful participants, the evidence varies with respect to what mechanism 
underlies such a bias (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Ouimet et al., 2009). According to Ouimet 
et al., this variability may be attributable to individual differences in associative and rule-
based processing. 
Dual-Systems Understanding of Cognitive Bias in Spider Fear 
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 Dual-systems models propose that a given stimulus activates two distinct but 
interacting cognitive systems simultaneously: the associative and rule-based systems 
(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  Spreading activation of the associative system rapidly 
activates concepts related to the stimulus in memory, including specific attitudes, beliefs, 
or behaviours.  Concurrently, the rule-based system appraises the subjective truth-value 
of the activated links and may serve to confirm or alter the responses generated by the 
associative system (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  When the respective responses 
of each system conflict, factors such as arousal, cognitive load, and motivation may 
influence which system ‘wins the race’.  With respect to cognitive bias in the anxiety 
disorders, Ouimet et al. (2009) contend in their recent model of cognitive vulnerability, 
that it is this self-regulatory conflict which dictates at which point individuals are able to 
disengage from threat-relevant stimuli.  Specifically, when a spider-fearful individual 
encounters a threat-relevant stimulus (e.g., spider picture), the rapid activation of his/her 
spider-related associative fear network leads to enhanced engagement with the stimulus.  
Concurrently, the rule-based system begins to analyze the factual relation between these 
concepts (e.g., “Is this spider stimulus actually dangerous?  Do I actually need to 
escape?”).  When the associative fear network remains active (e.g., because of continued 
engagement with the spider stimulus), it may enhance the likelihood of a threatening 
interpretation by the rule-based system.  In contrast, if an individual successfully engages 
in reappraising the stimulus as safe (or relatively neutral), the response generated by the 
rule-based system will be to disengage from the stimulus, thereby slowing down the 
spreading activation of the associative system, reducing anxiety, and weakening the 
strength of associative links over time.  If however, the individual attempts to negate the 
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threat value of the stimulus (e.g., the spider is not dangerous), rapid activation of threat-
related associations will continue (ironically – attributable to activation of ‘danger’ 
concepts in memory), impairing disengagement from the stimulus, increasing anxiety, 
and reinforcing associative links over time (Ouimet et al., 2009). Although the difference 
between ‘reappraisal’ and ‘negation’ is subtle, research from the social-cognitive 
literature has supported the contention that repeated negation of stereotypic associations 
leads to strengthening of such associations, whereas repeated reappraisal of the same 
associations results in their consequent weakening (Gawronski et al., 2008). Moreover, 
recent research from our lab demonstrates that compared to repeated reappraisal of 
spider-fear associations, repeated negation results in higher levels of reported spider fear 
(Ouimet, Barber, & Radomsky, 2011).  
 Associative processing in spider fear.  Several measures have been developed in 
recent years to assess associations in memory (e.g., Implicit Association Test [IAT]; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Go/No-go Association Task [GNAT]; Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001). Research has demonstrated that spider-fearful participants show stronger 
spider-fear associations than do snake-fearful and non-fearful participants (Ellwart, 
Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2007; but see de 
Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003). Additionally, scores on the IAT 
evidenced reduced strength among spider-fearful participants following Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT), with changes maintained at two month follow-up 
(Teachman & Woody, 2003).  
Research has generally supported the contention that, in comparison with non-
fearful participants, spider-fearful individuals exhibit stronger spider-relevant fear 
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networks.  Importantly, some studies have additionally shown that indirect measures (i.e., 
IAT) predict spider fear-related behaviour (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2005), physiological 
responses (Van Bockstaele et al., 2011a), and peak anxiety during a behavioural approach 
task (Teachman, 2007) independently of direct measures.  It may be that results obtained 
from direct questionnaires related to spider fear are attributable to a combination of 
associative and rule-based processes (Ouimet et al., 2009). In other words, individuals 
may moderate their responses to questionnaires following simultaneous rule-based 
appraisal of stimuli associated with fearful concepts in memory.  
Finally, a recent study examining the differential predictive power of indirect and 
direct measures of spider fear on behavioural and physiological fear responses to spiders 
assessed both spider-fear associative strength and attentional bias (Van Bockstaele et al., 
2011a).  Although direct and indirect measures of spider fear did not correlate 
significantly, stronger spider-fear associations were related to slower disengagement from 
spiders. Additionally, experimental reduction of spider-relevant attention bias did not 
lead to reduced spider-fear associations (Van Bockstaele et al., 2011b), providing 
preliminary support for the contention that such associations are not merely correlates of 
attention biases, but may be implicated in their development. 
The present study was designed as a preliminary test of a dual-systems model of 
attention bias in anxiety, wherein only the relationships between associative processing, 
attentional engagement/disengagement, and reported spider fear were measured (Ouimet 
et al., 2009). As outlined in Ouimet et al.’s model, stronger fear-relevant networks are 
posited to lead to enhanced engagement with and impaired disengagement from fear-
relevant stimuli, reflecting an attention bias which has been demonstrated to contribute at 
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least to the maintenance of anxious symptoms. As such, we examined whether speed of 
engagement and/or disengagement mediated the relationship between strength of spider-
fear associations and self-reported spider fear.  Participants completed a Go/No-go 
Association Task to assess the relative extent to which participants categorized spider 
pictures as “afraid” or “calm”, a visual search task (VST) to examine their ability to 
disengage from and detect spiders and categorically distinct insects, and self-report 
measures of spider fear and avoidance.  We hypothesized that, in line with Ouimet et al., 
stronger spider-fear associative links would predict impaired disengagement from spider 
stimuli (i.e., increased time to detect insect target among spider distracters), which would 
subsequently predict reported spider fear and avoidance.  
Method 
Participants  
One hundred thirty-one participants (79.5 % female, mean age = 22.68 [5.50] 
years) were recruited from the undergraduate psychology participant pool at Concordia 
University.  The majority of participants were single (92.1%) and of European descent 
(75.4%). They were compensated with course credit or with an entry in a draw for a cash 
prize.  
Apparatus 
 All questionnaires and cognitive tasks were administered on a Dell Precision 
T1500 desktop computer with a 22-inch monitor (30cm x 48cm). Participants were seated 




   
 
 Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995).  The 
FSQ is an 18-item questionnaire which assesses avoidance and fear of harm from spiders. 
Participants rated the extent to which they agreed (0 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree) 
with statements such as “If I came across a spider now, I would leave the room.”  The 
FSQ demonstrates excellent internal consistency (α = .92; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 
1995), test-retest reliability (r = .91), and good convergent and discriminant validity 
(Muris & Merckelbach, 1996).   
Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & 
Lang, 1974).  The SPQ is a 31-item measure, which asks participants to answer “true” or 
“false” to statements about cognitive and behavioural indices of spider fear such as “I 
avoid going to parks or on camping trips because there may be spiders about”.  The SPQ 
demonstrates excellent internal consistency (.95 < α < .97), test-retest reliability (r = .94), 
and differentiates between individuals with and without spider phobia (Muris & 
Merckelbach, 1996). 
 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993).  The BAI is a 21-item 
questionnaire where respondents rate the degree to which they have experienced 
symptoms of anxiety (e.g., hands trembling, nervous) during the past week.  The BAI is a 
frequently used measure of anxiety with well-established psychometric properties (Beck, 
Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI 
consists of 21 items related to symptoms of depression (e.g., fatigue, sadness, suicide 
ideation, restlessness) experienced over the preceding two weeks.  The BDI has well-
established psychometric properties (Dozois & Covin, 2004).  
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Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958).  The SUDS is a 
measure of state distress.  Respondents rate the extent to which they feel distressed on a 
scale from 0 (no distress) to 100 (extreme distress). These ratings have demonstrated 
correlations with physiological measures of stress (Thyer, Papsdorf, Davis, & Vallecorsa, 
1984).  For the current experiment, participants completed the original SUDS as well as 3 
modified versions assessing feelings of happiness, frustration, and sleepiness. 
Stimulus ratings.  Participants completed a measure designed for this study 
assessing subjective pleasantness and fear-relevance of all presented stimulus categories.  
This measure consisted of 18-items, 2 per stimulus category (e.g., spider, beetle, zebra), 
which required participants to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale the extent to which 
they found each stimulus pleasant (0 = extremely unpleasant; 6 = extremely pleasant), 
how fearful they were of each stimulus (0 = no fear; 6 = terror), and how easily they were 
able to recognize each stimulus (0 = extremely unrecognizable; 6 = extremely 
recognizable).   
Cognitive Tasks 
Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). The GNAT was 
used to measure spider-related associations in memory. The design of the GNAT was 
modeled after Teachman (2007). Participants’ pressed the “Go” button (spacebar) if the 
presented stimuli fell into either the category presented on one side of the screen (e.g., 
spider) or represented the attribute presented on the other side of the screen (e.g., afraid; 
see Figure 1).  Otherwise, they were required not to respond, but to wait for the next trial 
to begin. Strong spider-related associative fear networks were inferred from greater speed 
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Figure 1  






of stimulus categorization when the category “spider” was paired with the attribute 
“afraid”, than when it was paired with the attribute “calm”.  
The GNAT consisted of two critical, counterbalanced blocks (60 trials each).  For 
all trials in Block A, the word “SPIDER” appeared on the top left side of the screen, and 
the word “AFRAID” appeared on the top right.  For Block B, the word “spider” 
continued to appear, but was paired with the word “calm” on the right side of the screen.  
The target and descriptor labels (i.e., “SPIDER”, “AFRAID”, and “CALM”) appeared in 
white Arial font (all capital letters), sized to occupy 5% of the screen (1.5 cm in height).  
Picture stimuli appeared in the center of the screen, and measured 6.5 cm high by 6.5 cm 
wide; lexical stimuli were identical in form to the target and descriptor labels. Each 
participant began the task by completing three counterbalanced single categorization 
blocks, consisting of 12 trials each.   
With respect to the critical paired blocks, only the target (i.e., spider pictures) and 
attribute-consistent descriptor trials (e.g., fear-related words when “spider” is paired with 
“fear”) were used for analyses.  As such, twice as many target and attribute-consistent 
descriptor trials were presented compared to filler and attribute-inconsistent descriptor 
trials, to increase reliability of the task (see Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Teachman, 2007).  To 
balance time-pressure and accuracy, target and attribute-consistent filler stimuli were 
presented for 1400ms (or until key-press), whereas filler and attribute-inconsistent 
descriptor stimuli were presented for 1000ms.  Stimuli appeared in a completely 
randomized order across trials, with no constraints applied to which type of stimulus 
appeared on which trial, other than the ratio constraint described above.  For each block, 
each stimulus within a given category was presented at least once before it was repeated.  
Error feedback was presented for 500 ms following each incorrect key-press or omission 
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of key-press (red “X” in the center of the screen); correct responses were followed by a 
green “O” in the center of the screen. Error feedback was followed by an interstimulus 
interval (ISI) of 1000ms.  For the current sample, internal consistency was excellent for 
log-transformed responses on the Spider+Afraid trials (α = .91), Spider+Calm trials (α = 
.89), and composite reliability (see Table 1).  
Stimuli.  For each trial, a single stimulus appeared in the center of the screen.  
Stimuli consisted of category pictures and attribute words.  Twenty pictures of spiders 
varying in size and type functioned as target stimuli, whereas filler stimuli consisted of 
other animals (rabbits, snakes, bears, crocodiles, zebras), varying in threat level.  
Attribute words (20 per attribute category) described either feelings of calmness (e.g., 
relaxed, serene, cool, tranquil), or feelings related to fear (e.g., terrified, scared, timid, 
anxious).  All stimuli were piloted for recognizability, valence, and fear-relevance1.   
 Visual search task (VST).  The current visual search task was modeled after the 
odd-one-out search task described by Rinck et al., (2005), which assesses engagement 
with and disengagement from spider stimuli.  The first trial began with the presentation 
of a white fixation cross in the center of the screen for 500 ms, followed by a 4x4 matrix 
of 16 ‘bug’ pictures, which remained on the screen until key press or until 6000 ms had 
elapsed. Participants were asked to press a “yes” button on the keyboard if a discrepant 
stimuli (i.e., odd-one-out) appeared among 15 categorically homogenous stimuli, or to 
press a “no” button on the keyboard if all the stimuli within a matrix belonged to the 
same bug category (i.e., spider, butterfly, beetle, or dragonfly). For all trials, incorrect 
responses were followed by the 250 ms presentation of a red “X” in the center of the 
screen and correct responses were followed by a green “O”, which acted as fixation 
                                                 
1 Detailed description of pilot data and analyses are available from the corresponding author. 
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crosses for subsequent trials. Error feedback was followed by a 500 ms interstimulus 
interval (ISI). One hundred thirty trials were presented to each participant: 24 
engagement, 24 disengagement, 36 control, 40 target absent, and six practice trials.  
For engagement trials (see Figure 2), participants were asked to indicate the 
presence of a spider, beetle, or butterfly among a matrix of dragonflies. Impaired 
disengagement trials, in contrast, consisted of a dragonfly target, but the homogenous 
distracters were spiders, beetles, or butterflies. For both types of matrices, eight trials of 
each matrix form were presented (e.g., eight spider among dragonflies matrices). Control 
search trials included six trials of each possible variation of targets and distracters, other 
than those included in the engagement and disengagement trials. Forty target-absent trials 
(10 for each type of stimulus) were interspersed throughout the experiment to ensure that 
participants maintained careful responding. Six practice trials were presented prior to the 
124 experimental trials. For each trial, the placement of the target and the arrangement of 
the distractors were completely randomized. 
Stimuli.  Stimuli included 16 pictures each of spiders, butterflies, beetles, and 
dragonflies, which were piloted for fear-relevance, pleasantness, and recognisability.  As 
predicted, spiders were rated as most anxiety-provoking followed by beetles, dragonflies, 
and butterflies. Pictures measured 5.5 cm by 5.5 cm and, on each trial, were presented on 
a black background in 4x4 matrices. Pictures were evenly spaced across the screen and 
were centred both horizontally and vertically. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. Before beginning the experiment,  
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Figure 2  





participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to pilot new measures of  
cognitive processing. All further instructions, tasks, and questionnaires were presented 
via the computer using Inquisit 3.0 Desktop experimental software (2009). 
 Participants began the experiment by completing a demographic questionnaire 
and initial SUDS ratings for fear, happiness, frustration, and sleepiness. Subsequently, 
they completed either the GNAT or VST, the ordering of which was counterbalanced 
across participants. Following the completion of the first computer task, participants 
rested during a two-minute break in the testing room and then completed SUDS ratings 
for a second time. Participants then completed the second computerized task, followed by 
a break, and SUDS ratings. Finally, participants completed all mood questionnaires on 
the computer, in a completely randomized order, with the constraint that measures 
assessing pleasantness, recognizability, and fear-relevance of experimental stimuli were 
completed last.  
Results 
Data Preparation 
 GNAT. Similar to Teachman (2007), distracter trials were removed from analyses 
and error rates were calculated for each block. One participant was excluded for an 
overall accuracy rate of 63%. All reaction times shorter than 300 ms were deleted. 
Additionally, the data was examined to ensure that no participant responded randomly 
(<300ms) on more than 10% of trials.  For remaining trials, overall mean accuracy rates 
and mean accuracy rates for each block were greater than 99%.  Response times for each 
trial were log-transformed, and a mean score was obtained for each block. A GNAT score 
was computed for each participant by subtracting the mean response times for the 
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Spider+Afraid block from the mean response times for the Spider+Calm block, such that 
higher GNAT scores reflected stronger spider-fear associations. Two GNAT scores fell 
greater than 3 standard deviations above the mean; these participants were excluded.  
 VST. Data from the VST were examined for accuracy rates after the removal of 
target absent trials. In contrast with previous research which demonstrated reasonable 
error rates for this task (e.g., 2%, Rinck et al., 2005), one sixth of participants had error 
rates greater than 25% across all trials of the VST, and error rates were significantly 
different according to trial type, F(2, 250) = 95.58, p < .001. Participants were less 
accurate on spider-disengagement trials than on spider-engagement, t(250) = -14.1, p < 
.001, and non-spider trials, t(250) = -8.73, p < .001, and less accurate on engagement 
trials than on non-spider trials, t(250) = 4.5, p < .001. Given the unexpected differences 
in accuracy according to trial type, it would not be reasonable to exclude participants 
based on low accuracy because this appears to be an important variable related to the 
current hypotheses. Reaction time data was calculated only for trials on which 
participants correctly identified whether an odd-one-out was present in the matrix.  
One participant evidenced response times greater than three standard deviations 
above the mean and his/her data were thus excluded from subsequent analyses. 
Descriptive data for the GNAT and VST for the final sample (n =126) are presented in 
Table 1. Consistent with previous research, participants evidenced significant differences 
in reaction time depending on trial type, F(2, 124) = 8.20, p < .001. Specifically, 
participants were slower on disengagement trials than on engagement, t(124) = 4.04, p < 




Table 1  
Descriptive data (n = 126, except SUDS =125) 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. α 
GNAT-log .054 .067 -.14 .20 .94 
VST Accuracy - - - - - 
Overall .84 .08 .62 .98 - 
Spider-engagement .90 .07 .65 1.00 - 
Spider-disengagement .75 .12 .45 1.00 - 
Non-spider control .85 .10 .55 1.00 - 
VST Reaction times (ms) - - - - - 
Overall 2122.15 339.56 1337.74 2970.44 .93 
Spider-engagement 2084.56 375.92 1117.31 3019.31 .77 
Spider-disengagement 2193.23 438.81 794.69 3449.13 .81 





     
Disengagement speed (ms) 86.29 335.24 -1854.38 753.82 - 
Engagement speed (ms) -22.38 278.85 -1299.07 776.58 - 
Disengagement accuracy (%) -9.59 12.65 -48.00 25.00 - 
Engagement accuracy (%) 4.54 10.76 17.00 45.00 - 
BAI 11.03 8.14 0.00 49.00 .89 
BDI 10.08 8.01 0.00 46.00 .90 
FSQ 33.74 35.67 0.00 122.00 .97 
SPQ 10.87 7.55 1.00 30.00 .93 
SRs 3.64 0.75 1.00 5.00 - 
SUDS: Pre-test 21.57 25.77 0.00 100.00 - 
SUDS: Post-GNAT 22.42 25.92 0.00 100.00 - 
SUDS: Post-VST 23.54 24.99 0.00 90.00 - 
GNAT-log = log-transformed Go/No-go Association Task; VST = visual search task; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI  = Beck Depression Inventory; FSQ = Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; SPQ = 
Spider Phobia Questionnaire; SRs = stimulus ratings; SUDS = subjective units of distress scale, anxiety item
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  Difference scores for both accuracy and reaction times were calculated to 
generate four indices: (1) Disengagement speed (Disengagement RT - Non-spider RT); 
positive scores reflect impaired disengagement, negative scores reflect facilitated 
disengagement; (2) Engagement speed (Engagement RT - Non-spider RT); positive 
scores reflect reduced engagement, negative scores reflect enhanced engagement; (3) 
Disengagement accuracy (Disengagement accuracy - Non-spider accuracy); positive 
scores reflect higher accuracy, negative scores reflect less accuracy; and (4) Engagement 
accuracy (Engagement accuracy - Non-spider accuracy); positive scores reflect higher 
accuracy, negative scores reflect less accuracy. One-sample t-tests demonstrated that all 
index means were significantly different from 0 (p < .006) except for engagement speed, 
which was not significantly different from 0.  
 Sample Characteristics 
 Preliminary analyses included an examination of participants’ scores on various 
mood measures (see Table 1). Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) indicated that there were 
no significant differences on scores of variables of interest according to age, examiner, 
handedness, or level of education. A significant effect of sex emerged such that female 
participants scored higher on measures of reported spider fear (FSQ, F[1,125] = 7.63; 
SPQ, F[1, 125] = 15.68; SRs, F[1, 124] = 8.39, all ps < .05) and spider-fear associations 
(GNAT, F[1,125] = 5.35, p < .05) than did male participants. There were no significant 
differences in performance on the GNAT or VST depending on which task participants 
completed first. A block order effect did emerge, however, for the GNAT. Participants 
who completed the Spider+Calm block before the Spider+Afraid block showed 
significantly stronger spider-fear associations, t(1) = 3.13, p < .01. Most people are 
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quicker to categorize spiders as fear-related; this effect was enhanced by practice for 
participants who completed the Spider+Afraid block following the Spider+Calm block 
and attenuated for participants who completed the blocks in the opposite order.  
Subjective Mood Data 
 Subjective measures of distress, happiness, frustration, and sleepiness were 
administered at pre-test and after each cognitive task (three time points). Four separate 2 
(counterbalance order) x 3 (time point) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to 
assess whether mood changed as a result of cognitive task order, and the extent to which 
this was influenced by task type. Although all four mood types changed according to 
similar patterns, significant findings were obtained for measures of happiness and 
frustration only. Specifically, regardless of condition, participants were less happy with 
the completion of each subsequent task (main effect of time; F[2, 123] = 11.48, p < .01). 
There was a trend towards an interaction between time and condition, which suggested 
that individuals showed the greatest decreases in happiness following completion of the 
VST as compared to the GNAT, F(2, 123) = 2.63, p = .08. Participants evidenced 
significantly greater levels of subjective frustration at time 2, t(2) = 3.44, p < .05, and 
time 3, t(2) = 4.44, p < .05, as compared to time 1. Moreover, an interaction between 
condition and time emerged such that participants indicated the greatest increases in 
frustration following the VST as compared to the GNAT, F(2, 123) = 6.57, p < .05. 
Correlations 
 Generally, correlations (see Table 2) were consistent with previous research, in 
that measures of psychopathology were significantly correlated, with the strongest 
correlations emerging amongst measures assessing similar constructs (e.g., FSQ, SPQ). 
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Of particular interest to the current hypotheses were small, but significantly or marginally 
significant positive relationships between spider-fear associations and self-reported spider 
fear, anxiety ratings of spider stimuli, and pre-test state anxiety (SUDS measured prior to 
beginning first task). Additionally, stronger spider-fear associations were associated with 
reduced accuracy on the spider disengagement accuracy index only. Finally, higher 
reported levels of spider fear were related to faster response times for spider-engagement 
and spider disengagement trials.  
 Closer examination of the finding that spider fear was associated with faster 
response times on disengagement trials, in contrast with previous findings, indicated that 
greater accuracy was generally significantly associated with decreased speed. Results 
were consistent with a speed/accuracy trade-off. Moreover, it appears that reaction times 
and accuracy on the VST may be distinctly related to indirect (i.e., GNAT) and direct 
(i.e., self-report questionnaires) measures of spider fear. As such, the inclusion of all four 
indices of attention bias as possible mediators of the relationship between spider-fear 
associations and reported spider fear was warranted. 
Mediation Analyses 
 Three separate multiple mediation analyses were conducted according to the 
Bootstrapping approach (5000 samples, 95% confidence interval, bias corrected and 
accelerated) using the SPSS INDIRECT macro created by Preacher and Hayes (2008)2. 
For each analysis, the independent variable was GNAT score, and the four attention 
indices described earlier were included as mediators: (1) Disengagement speed, 
                                                 
2 The INDIRECT macro provides confidence intervals (CIs) for unstandardized coefficients only. To 
obtain standardized coefficients, analyses were run a second time using standardized variables (z-scores) 






 Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. GNAT-log - -.13 -.02 -.18* -.16 .00 .00 .15 .18* .20* .27** .16 .16 
 VST Indices - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. DG speed (ms) - - .53** -.14 -.32** -.05 .10 -.26** -.28** -.26** -.21* -.-09 -.08 
3. EG speed (ms) - - - -.32** -.35** -.03 .07 -.22* -.20* -.22* -.12 -.04 -.12 
4. DG accuracy (%) - - - - .56** -.08 -.03 -.13 -.13 -.12 .04 .03 .02 
5. EG accuracy (%) - - - - - -.08 .03 .01 .02 .02 -.02 .00 .03 
6. BAI - - - - - - .65** .06 .18* .16 -.08 -.05 .06 
7. BDI - - - - - - - -.02 .07 .11 -.05 -.01 .05 
8. FSQ - - - - - - - - .84** .70** .14 .24** .30** 
9. SPQ - - - - - - - - - .67** .12 .20* .26** 
10. SRs - - - - - - - - - - .10 .21* .31** 
11. SUDS Pretest - - - - - - - - - - - .72** .61** 
12. SUDS PostGNAT - - - - - - - - - - - - .87** 
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13. SUDS PostVST - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
* p < .05, **p < .01;; GNAT-log = log-transformed Go/No-go Association Task; VST = visual search task;  DG = Disengagement; EG = EngagementBAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI  = Beck 
Depression Inventory; FSQ = Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; SPQ = Spider Phobia Questionnaire; SRs = stimulus ratings; SUDS = subjective units of distress scale, anxiety items
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(2) Engagement speed, (3) Disengagement accuracy, and (4) Engagement accuracy. The 
three models were different from one another in the dependent variable only. A separate 
mediation analysis was therefore conducted for each of three measures of reported spider 
fear: (1) FSQ, (2) SPQ, and (3) mean ratings of spider stimuli as anxiety-provoking (See 
Figure 3 for models and standardized coefficients).  
 FSQ. Results demonstrated that of the four mediators, spider-fear associations 
predicted only disengagement accuracy (unstandardized b = -.35, SE = .17, t = -2.07, p < 
.05). Similarly, scores on the FSQ were predicted only by disengagement accuracy 
(unstandardized b = 60.04, SE = 29.97, t = -2.00, p < .05). For both relationships, higher 
levels of spider fear (indirect and direct) were related to lower levels of disengagement 
accuracy. No significant relationship between spider-fear associations and reported spider 
fear was observed. Overall, the model significantly accounted for 12.62% of the variance 
in FSQ scores (F[5, 120] = 3.47, p < .006). Moreover, percentile confidence intervals 
(CIs) indicated that spider-fear associations exerted a significant indirect effect on 
reported spider fear via disengagement accuracy only (95% CI: .05 - 65.51). The total 
indirect effect of all mediators was not significant (95% CI: -1.50 - 83.45). 
 SPQ. Similar to analyses using the FSQ as the dependent variable, disengagement 
accuracy was the only mediator predicted by spider-fear associations (unstandardized b = 
-.35, SE = .17, t = -2.07, p < .05). There were also trends for disengagement speed 
(unstandardized b = -.005, SE = .002, t = -1.91, p < .06) and disengagement accuracy 
(unstandardized b = -12.23, SE = 6.31, t = -1.94, p < .06) to predict scores on the SPQ. 
Examination of the directionality of such effects suggested that faster, but less accurate 
performance on disengagement trials was related to higher levels of reported spider fear.
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* p < .05, †p < .06; all values are standardized coefficients; an = effects of IV on mediators; bn = effects of mediators on DV; 
c = total effect of IV on DV; c’ = direct effect of IV on DV; GNAT = Go/No-go Association Task; DG = Disengagement; 
EG = Engagement; FSQ = Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; SPQ = Spider Phobia Questionnaire; SRs = stimulus ratings 
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SPQ scores were significantly predicted by spider-fear associations (unstandardized b = 
20.65, SE = 9.95, t = 2.08, p < .05), however this relationship became nonsignificant after 
accounting for the mediators (unstandardized b = 13.66, SE = 9.93, t = 1.38, n.s.). 
Overall, the model significantly accounted for 13.58% of the variance in reported spider 
fear (F[5, 120] = 3.77, p < .004). Spider-fear associations demonstrated an indirect 
relationship with reported spider fear via disengagement accuracy only (95% CI: .06 - 
13.72). 
 Spider ratings. Because of a computer error, fear-relevance ratings of spider 
stimuli were unavailable for 1 participant. Results of the multiple mediation analyses (n = 
125) indicated that spider-fear associations predicted only disengagement accuracy 
(unstandardized b = -.35, SE = .17, t = -2.11, p < .05). No mediators emerged as 
significant predictors of spider ratings. The total effect of spider-fear associations on 
reported spider fear was significant (unstandardized b = 2.19, SE = .98, t = 2.22, p < .05), 
but was no longer significant after accounting for the proposed mediators (direct effect; 
unstandardized b = 1.59, SE = .99, t = 1.61, n.s.). Overall, the model accounted for 
13.18% of the variance in reported spider fear, which was a significant effect (F[5, 119] = 
3.61, p < .005). As with the FSQ and SPQ, spider-fear associations exerted a significant 
indirect effect on spider ratings via disengagement accuracy only (95% CI: .02 - 1.34). 
Discussion 
 The current study was designed to test the hypothesis that strong spider-fear 
associations predict impaired (i.e., slower) disengagement from spiders, which in turn, 
predicts increased reported spider fear. Results were partially consistent with hypotheses. 
Multiple mediation models provided evidence for the contention that associative links in 
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memory are related to attention bias and explicit fear. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study which demonstrates a meditational relationship between indirect and direct 
measures of anxiety via cognitive bias; however, the pattern of attention processes 
diverged from previous literature. Specifically, strong spider-fear associations predicted 
less accurate disengagement from spiders, which subsequently predicted higher levels of 
reported spider fear. Moreover, the pattern of correlations suggested that higher spider 
fear was related to faster disengagement, which is in contrast with a large body of 
research clearly demonstrating slower disengagement from feared stimuli. 
Recent conceptualizations of anxiety implicate information processing not only in 
its maintenance, but also in its aetiology (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet et al., 
2009). Basic cognitive theory centers on the idea that cognition causes affect (Beck & 
Emery, 1985); however, with the exception of one prospective study (MacLeod & Hagan, 
1992), the majority of studies examining cognitive bias and anxiety have been 
correlational in nature. A recent surge in the literature examining the effects of 
experimentally manipulating cognitive bias on emotional vulnerability has provided some 
support for the hypothesis that attention bias may contribute to the development of 
anxiety disorders (e.g., MacLeod, Campbell, Rutherford, & Wilson, 2004). Several 
studies have demonstrated the efficacy of cognitive bias modification in the treatment of 
generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia, as well as the reduction of high trait 
anxiety (see Bar-Haim, 2010, for a review). Moreover, successful CBT treatment of 
anxiety symptoms is associated with a decrease in attentional bias (Tobon, Ouimet, & 
Dozois, 2011). Although the current study cannot demonstrate causality because of the 
lack of manipulation of cognitive bias, results are consistent with the contention that 
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cognitive bias can precede (at least statistically) reported fear. Furthermore, our findings 
extend those of previous studies by incorporating the associative system as a fundamental 
cognitive system, which influences cognitive processes associated with disengagement 
from threatening stimuli. It is important to note, however, that due to the correlational 
nature of the current study, these findings may also be consistent with other theories or 
patterns of causality, which were not tested in the current study. It will be important to 
manipulate these variables experimentally in future research to better elucidate the 
possible directions of causality. 
Research has consistently demonstrated the existence of attention biases amongst 
anxious samples, regardless of posited direction of causality (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Additionally, recent research has demonstrated that indirect measures of spider fear (i.e., 
‘implicit’ spider fear and impaired disengagement) jointly predict more ‘automatic’ 
behaviour such as autonomic response to a spider, whereas direct measures of spider fear 
(i.e., self-report questionnaires or ‘explicit’ fear) best predict more ‘controlled’ behaviour 
such as avoidance of a spider; indirect and direct measures of spider fear were 
uncorrelated (Van Bockstaele et al., 2011a). In line with these findings, we contend that 
implicit and explicit fear likely exert distinct influences on physiological reactions, 
fearful behaviour, and self-reported fear; however, research also supports a small but 
important relationship between direct and indirect measures (Teachman, 2007). Our 
finding that higher spider-fear associations were correlated with measures of reported 
spider fear, but not measures of general anxiety or depression suggest that increased 
match between direct and indirect measures likely increases the observed relationship 
between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ processes (cf., Rydell & McConnell, 2010). Moreover, 
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meditational models suggested that this relationship was indirect in nature, via reduced 
disengagement accuracy. Examination of patterns of correlation, however, indicated 
distinct relationships between attentional bias and direct and indirect measures of spider 
fear. Specifically, when measured indirectly (i.e., GNAT), spider fear was associated 
with disengagement accuracy only. When measured directly (i.e., FSQ, SPQ, SRs), 
however, spider fear demonstrated correlations with engagement and disengagement 
speed, but not accuracy, highlighting the importance of assessing cognitive bias as a 
multi-stage process. 
The finding that threat-relevant attention bias occurs amongst anxious samples is 
robust (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Attention, however, consists of ordered, but overlapping 
stages (e.g., Posner, 1980) which may exert distinct, but related influences on the 
development and maintenance of anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009). Moreover, research 
examining the existence of biases at each stage of processing has provided equivocal 
results. These findings, in tandem with those of our study, highlight the importance of 
methodologically rigorous studies which assess various components of attentional bias. 
By evaluating accuracy, speed, and response slowing on measures of orientation, 
engagement, disengagement, and avoidance, the effects of such processes on the 
aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders may be clarified.  
 Consistent with prior research, participants in the current study were quicker to 
find spiders among neutral distractors (i.e., beetles, butterflies and/or dragonflies) than 
they were to detect the presence of a neutral target among typically fear-relevant 
distractors (e.g., Flykt, 2006). Because all stimuli used in the current study were from a 
similar animal class (i.e., both targets and distractors were bugs; most prior research 
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involved finding spiders in matrices of flowers or mushrooms), our findings provide 
support for the contention that the fear-relevance of the stimulus rather than the 
physiological distinctness of the target or distractors likely drives observed differences in 
reaction times. However, contrary to previous research, higher spider fear was associated 
with faster as opposed to slower detection of neutral targets among spider distractors. 
Additionally, differences in accuracy were noted, wherein all participants were least 
accurate on disengagement trials and most accurate on engagement trials; with an 
enhanced effect observed among more highly spider fearful participants.  
 Our visual search task closely modeled the odd-one-out task described by Rinck 
et al. (2005). Whereas those researchers selected their participants into high- and low-
spider fearful groups based on scores on self-report measures of spider fear, our 
participants were unselected for spider fear, with the assumption that their fear levels 
would fall along a broad continuum. For our sample, approximately 30% of participants 
fell within the “high fearful” range delineated by Rinck et al. As such, it is possible that 
the typical high fear-slow disengagement relationship is detected only when comparing 
highly fearful and non-fearful participants. Although not tested statistically, a brief 
exploration of possible groups in our sample indicated that participants who fell within 
the top third of spider fear on both indirect and direct measures of spider fear (n = 20) 
were faster to disengage from spiders (mean RT = 1966.43, SD = 461.68) than were 
individuals who fell within the bottom third of both indices (n = 17, mean RT = 2398.58, 
SD = 267.22), mirroring the results of our correlations. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
divergence of our results from previous research is attributable to nonclinical levels of 
spider fear.  
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 Participants in the current study evidenced reaction times similar to those reported 
by Rinck et al. (2005), but substantially longer than those described in other studies using 
visual search paradigms, albeit with varying methodologies. Indeed, participants in our 
study demonstrated mean response times in excess of 2 seconds, which is substantially 
longer than what is typically observed in studies assessing attention bias. Given these 
longer response times, it is possible that, consistent with vigilance-avoidance models of 
attention (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), high 
spider-fearful participants were faster than low spider-fearful participants to detect a 
neutral stimulus amongst spiders because of posited later-stage processing avoidance 
tendencies. In other words, effortful avoidance of spider distractors may have lead to 
more efficient detection of neutral targets.  
In tandem with the discrepant response time findings, results of the current study 
included differences in accuracy on the visual search task. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the spider VST may not represent a “pure” measure of disengagement, but 
likely assesses related processes including attentional capture, appraisal, and task-
switching. For example, given the observed reduced disengagement accuracy associated 
with increased spider fear, it is possible that highly spider fearful participants were more 
likely to erroneously identify target bugs (e.g., beetles) as spiders, thereby decreasing 
their accuracy. As such, this task may not have offered an appropriate test of the original 
study hypothesis. Future studies investigating the relationships between spider-fear 
associations, impaired disengagement, and reported spider fear should endeavour to use 
tasks that reduce the influence of variables such as working memory load, set-shifting, 
and emotional arousal on indices of disengagement speed. 
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The role of rule-based or ‘controlled’ processes may be particularly important in 
clarifying the results of the current study. Given the longer response times, it is likely that 
such processes influenced the accuracy and rate of responding on the VST (Ouimet et al., 
2009). For example, participants with strong spider-fear associations and adaptive rule-
based coping skills may have been adept at discriminating between spiders and “other 
bugs”, thereby decreasing the mean reaction time for high spider-fearful participants on 
relevant trials. Moreover, research has consistently demonstrated a negative interpretive 
bias among anxious participants (e.g., Becker & Rinck, 2004; de Jong & Muris, 2002; 
Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010). Therefore, it is possible that spider fearful 
participants in the current study were faster to identify spider distractors as such, perhaps 
facilitating performance on disengagement trials. They may also have been likely to 
misinterpret other bugs (e.g., beetles) as spiders, thereby contributing to correlations 
between reduced accuracy and higher spider fear. Future research examining the interplay 
between associative and rule-based processes in fear-relevant attention bias is essential. 
Finally, the current study provides evidence for the importance of understanding 
basic cognitive processes such as those of the associative system. Indeed, strong fear-
related associative links in memory may be part of a broad vulnerability factor for 
emotional disorders. Continued investigation of the roles played by the associative and 
rule-based systems may help us to develop and refine current efficacious treatments of 
anxiety disorders. For example, it is possible that although cognitive restructuring 
effectively targets explicit beliefs related to the danger of spiders, strong associative links 
between the concepts of ‘spider’ and ‘fear’ remain, thereby influencing an individual’s 
fearful or avoidant behaviour. Treatments that target both associative (e.g., by 
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encouraging successful interactions with spiders) and rule-based (e.g., by practicing 
cognitive reappraisal of feared stimuli) factors involved in the perpetuation of anxiety 






 A recent model of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety posits that individual 
differences in associative and rule-based processing may help to explain discrepant 
findings related to the time-course of observed attentional biases among anxious samples 
(Ouimet et al., 2009). Study 1 was designed to investigate one component of this model 
in relation to spider fear: that stronger spider-fear associative links in memory would 
predict impaired disengagement from spider stimuli, which would subsequently predict 
higher levels of reported spider fear. Undergraduate student participants completed 
computerized tasks assessing the strength of their associations between spider and fear 
(relative to spider and calm), and both the speed and accuracy with which they engaged 
with and disengaged from spider stimuli on a visual search task. Subsequently, they 
completed self-report questionnaires of spider fear and avoidance.  
 Results demonstrated, consistent with previous literature, that overall, participants 
were slowest on disengagement trials and fastest on engagement trials. In contrast with 
previous literature and hypotheses however, higher levels of reported spider fear were 
correlated with faster engagement with and disengagement from spiders. Moreover, 
significant differences in accuracy were noted: participants were least accurate on 
disengagement trials and most accurate on non-spider trials. Stronger spider-fear 
associations were correlated with reduced disengagement accuracy.  
A series of meditational models (using Bootstrapping methods) was conducted. 
Results generally demonstrated an indirect relationship between spider-fear associations, 
disengagement accuracy, and reported spider fear. Specifically, stronger spider-fear 
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associations predicted reduced disengagement accuracy, which subsequently predicted 
increased reported spider fear. The amount of variance accounted for by these models 
was small, and varied depending on which questionnaire was entered as the criterion 
variable (12.62% – 13.58%). Given these findings, it is important to investigate the 
potential role played by rule-based processing. Indeed, recent research has demonstrated 
that attentional control may moderate attention to threat-relevant faces (Barratt & 
Bundesen, 2012; Susa, Pitică, Benga, & Miclea, 2012). 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) contend that evaluation of associations 
activated by the associative system is accomplished via the rule-based system in one of 
three ways: (1) affirmation, (2) negation, or (3) reappraisal. The type of appraisal used is 
further hypothesized to influence the point at which a spider-fearful person is able to 
disengage from spider stimuli (Ouimet et al., 2009). Specifically, repeated negation of 
spider-fear associations is posited to lead to ironic strengthening of spider-fear 
associations and consequently, impaired disengagement and increased reported spider 
fear, whereas the opposite pattern is expected following repeated reappraisal of spiders as 
safe. Study 2, therefore, was designed to examine the effects of experimental 
manipulation of rule-based processing on patterns of attentional responding to spider 
stimuli and reported levels of spider fear. In this study, unselected volunteer participants 
were randomly assigned to either repeatedly negate or repeatedly reappraise the threat-
value of spiders. Subsequently, they completed a visual search task and spider-fear 





THE EFFECTS OF REPEATED NEGATION AND REPEATED REAPPRAISAL 
ON THREAT-RELATED ATTENTION AND SPIDER FEAR 
A substantive body of literature supports the existence of threat-relevant 
attentional biases among anxious samples (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for a recent meta-
analysis).  Discrepant findings across experiments, however, suggest that the stage at 
which attention biases occur is less clear (Ouimet et al., 2009). Specifically, attention is 
believed to occur across multiple stages: (1) orientation, (2) engagement, (3) 
disengagement, and (4) avoidance. Both supportive and contradictory evidence for threat-
relevant bias has emerged at each of these stages (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001; Osinsky et al., 2008; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997; van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, 
& de Jong, 1997). A recent model of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety contends that 
inconsistent findings related to the time-course of attentional bias may be explained by 
individual differences in associative and rule-based processing (Ouimet et al., 2009). 
Dual-Systems Models of Cognition 
Although the features of associative and rule-based processing may be similar to 
those that describe automatic (e.g., outside of consciousness, unintentional, 
uncontrollable, effortless) and strategic processes ( e.g., conscious, intentional, 
controllable, effortful) (Bargh, 1994), their operating principles are distinct (Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2009). Indeed, it is the process by which these systems function (i.e., 
associative vs. rule-based), and not their characteristics (e.g., automatic vs. controlled, 
conscious vs. unconscious, implicit vs. explicit) that are the focus of this study. 
Associative processing involves the rapid activation of associated concepts in memory, 
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whereas rule-based processing entails the evaluation of factual relationships among 
cognitive concepts. The systems have been proposed to work in parallel to problem-solve 
(e.g., Sloman, 1996), evaluate and change social judgments (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006), regulate emotions (e.g., Smith & Neumann, 2005), and influence 
behaviour (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006); however, the responses produced by each 
system can conflict. This conflict may underlie divergent evidence related to the time-
course of responding to threat-relevant stimuli in anxious samples (Ouimet et al., 2009). 
Specifically, the interplay between individual differences in threat-relevant associative 
network strength and effective use of rule-based reasoning to evaluate the threat level of 
the stimuli may determine when an individual will disengage his/her attention from 
threat-relevant stimuli. 
For example, when exposed to a spider, the associative system of a spider fearful 
individual may activate strongly related concepts such as ‘fear’ and ‘danger’. This rapid 
activation of fear-related concepts is hypothesized to enhance initial orientation and 
engagement with the spider (Ouimet et al., 2009). The rule-based system, simultaneously 
activated by exposure to the spider, is posited to evaluate whether the activated 
associations are legitimate (e.g., is the spider actually dangerous?). Continued 
engagement with the stimulus and continued activation of fear-related concepts in the 
associative system is believed to heighten the likelihood of a threatening appraisal of the 
spider, thereby potentially increasing engagement and making disengagement more 
difficult. Alternatively, reappraisal of the spider as safe/neutral may override the 
associative system, potentially facilitating disengagement from the spider and weakening 
spider-fear associative links over time. 
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Associative processing in spider fear. Because of the assumed ‘implicit’ or 
‘unconscious’ nature of associative networks, several inventive methodologies have been 
used to measure such constructs in social phobia (Dozois & Frewen, 2006; de Jong, 
2002), specific phobia (Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Teachman & Woody, 2003), 
posttraumatic stress disorder (Engelhard, Huijding, van den Hout, & de Jong, 2007), 
depression (Dozois et al., 2009; Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001), and in 
association with alcohol use (Houben & Wiers, 2008) and other substance use disorders 
(Rooke, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2008). These paradigms typically rely on reaction times 
in response to stimulus pairs as a measure of their relatedness (e.g., faster to respond to 
spider pictures when paired with ‘fear’ than when paired with ‘calm’). 
Research among spider fearful participants has demonstrated stronger links 
between ‘danger’ and ‘spider’ relative to ‘snake’ (Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001), 
stronger spider-fearful networks compared to low-fearful participants (e.g., Ellwart, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2005; Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Teachman, 2007), reduced spider-fear 
associations following exposure therapy (Teachman & Woody, 2003), and the prediction 
of spider-fearful responses and behaviour over and above overt measures of spider fear 
(Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2007; 
Teachman, 2007). Moreover, recent research has examined relationships between spider-
fear associations, attention bias, and spider fear. 
Van Bockstaele et al. (2011a) found that stronger spider-fear associations were 
correlated with impaired disengagement from spider stimuli. Additionally, experimental 
reduction of spider-relevant attention bias using a modified dot-probe task did not result 
in decreased spider-fear associations (Van Bockstaele et al., 2011b), suggesting that such 
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associations are not merely cognitive by-products of existing biases. Ouimet, Radomsky, 
and Barber (2012) demonstrated that spider-fear associations exerted an indirect effect on 
reported spider fear via reduced disengagement accuracy on a visual search task. Effect 
sizes for the influences of associative processes are generally small to moderate 
(Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; W. Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, 2005); investigation into the effects of rule-
based processing may help to elucidate the nature of cognition in anxiety. 
Rule-based processing in spider fear. Cognitive models of anxiety contend that 
anxious individuals show negative interpretive biases for neutral information (e.g., 
Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010). For example, clinically anxious individuals are 
more likely to disambiguate various scenarios as threatening compared to recovered 
clinically anxious and never anxious samples (Amir et al., 2005). Although it may seem 
intuitive to categorize interpretative and attentional biases as rule-based and associative 
processes, respectively, contemporary models of cognition argue that most stages of 
processing are likely influenced by both systems (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Ouimet et al., 
2009). As such, although interpretation is likely driven by the rule-based system, it is 
heavily influenced by the associative system (Ouimet et al., 2009). Therefore, research 
pertaining to interpretive biases provides a proxy measure of rule-based processing, but 
cannot be separated completely from associative processing. 
Individuals with spider fear are more likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
spider-related than are their non-fearful counterparts (e.g., Becker & Rinck, 2004), and 
overestimate the co-occurrence of spider stimuli and electric shock (e.g., de Jong, 
Merckelbach, & Arntz, 1995), as well as the probability that spiders will approach them 
55 
 
(de Jong & Muris, 2002). Moreover, interpretation bias may occur in the early stages of 
stimulus perception. Vasey et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that individuals who 
reported higher fear during exposure to a spider also estimated the size of the spiders to 
be larger. Finally, recent research suggested that the tendency to exhibit negative 
interpretive biases while in a negative mood state may be observed only among those 
with low regulatory control (a potential indicator of maladaptive rule-based processing) 
(Salemink & Wiers, 2012).  
In an examination of the potential causal role of interpretive bias in spider fear, 
Teachman and Addison (2008) randomly assigned spider fearful individuals into one of 
three interpretive training conditions: (1) positive, (2) neutral, or (3) no training. 
Following training, individuals in the positive condition were faster to generate positive 
interpretations than were individuals in the neutral condition. This interpretive 
manipulation, however, had no group effects on avoidance or subjective distress upon 
exposure to a live spider. A significant correlation between response latency to positive 
probes (i.e., positive interpretation bias) and fear and avoidance during a behavioural 
approach task (BAT), while controlling for negative interpretive bias during the first half 
of the task, provided some support for the hypothesis that interpretive training influenced 
reactivity to a spider task. However, as mentioned, this did not occur at the group level. 
Therefore, although interpretive training was successful, it exerted minimal effects on 
vulnerability to spider fear. These results are partially inconsistent with cognitive theories 
of anxiety which posit that affective change is mediated by cognitive change (e.g., 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).    
56 
 
The positive training condition used by Teachman and Addison (2008) involved 
disambiguating spider-related scenarios. For example, participants were asked to 
complete the word string in the following scenario: “You wake up in the middle of the 
night and see something on your alarm clock. You realize it is a spider. You think that it 
is (h--mless),” and then to answer the question “Is the spider a threat?” (pp. 451-452). 
The only correct answer to the word completion task would be “harmless”, which in itself 
is a negation. Participants were subsequently asked to negate the harm value of a spider 
by responding “no” to the follow-up question. Research in the social-cognitive area, 
however, has demonstrated that negation has ironic effects on subsequent attitudes 
(Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). As such, activation of the links 
between “harmlessness” and “spider” and between “no threat” and “spider” may activate 
the link between the dimension of harm and the concept of spider, which subsequently is 
hypothesized to lead to rapid spreading of activation to other associated concepts in 
memory, thereby potentially reinforcing, rather than disintegrating, established spider-
fear related links.  
Indeed, Gawronski et al. (2008) demonstrated that only repeated affirmations of 
counterstereotypes (e.g., strong women) resulted in changes in stereotypic attitudes. 
When participants were asked to repeatedly negate extant stereotypes (e.g., say “NO” to 
the pairing of “women” with “weak”), stereotypic associations were strengthened. It may 
be therefore, that in Teachman and Addison’s (2008) study, although negation of harm by 
the rule-based system led to decreased overt interpretation of spider stimuli as 
threatening, it ironically increased the strength of spider-related fear networks in the 
associative system, resulting in mixed effects on spider fear and related behaviour.  
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Consistent with the multi-process model of attention bias in anxiety (Ouimet et 
al., 2009), the current study was designed as a preliminary test of the hypothesis that 
repeated negation of spider-fear associations would result in impaired disengagement 
from spider stimuli and subsequently, higher levels of reported spider fear; repeated 
reappraisal of spiders as safe, however, was hypothesized to lead to facilitated 
disengagement from spider stimuli and subsequently, lower levels of reported spider fear. 
As such, a novel paradigm (the Non-Stereotypic Association Task [NSAT], described 
below) was employed to manipulate the extent to which existing spider-fear associations 
were activated. Although similar to cognitive bias modification paradigms (CBM), the 
NSAT is an experimental manipulation, not a form of CBM. Participants were randomly 
assigned either to repeatedly negate the fear-value of spiders or to repeatedly reappraise 
spiders as safe. They subsequently completed a visual search task and a battery of 
behavioural and affective measures. Because the NSAT was designed to activate extant 
associations, differences were expected only on those measures assessing spider fear. It 
was expected that the activation of existing spider-fear associations among participants in 
the Negate condition would lead to greater endorsement of items on the self-report spider 
fear measures, not because of changes in symptoms, per se, but because of greater 
cognitive availability of beliefs and experiences consistent with a fearful evaluation of 
spiders. Again, because the NSAT was expected to activate only spider-fear associations, 
general mood measures (e.g., BAI, see below) were not expected to differ between 
groups. 
Moreover, particular care was taken to minimize the effects of expectancy bias. 
Therefore the NSAT also required participants to negate the “calm-value” of butterflies, 
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or to reappraise butterflies as fear-related. Because it is unlikely that participants have 
strong emotional associations with butterflies in memory, this task was not expected to 
activate consistently any butterfly-emotion associations. Additionally, no pre-
manipulation measures of spider fear or attention bias were obtained, to avoid the 
likelihood of participants believing the NSAT was intended as a cognitive or emotional 
manipulation.      
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 134 undergraduate student volunteers (77.6% female; mean age 
= 23.70, SD = 6.56 years) at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada, compensated 
with course credit or with entry in a draw for cash prizes. The majority of participants 
was of European descent (69.4%) and was single (86.6%).  
Apparatus 
A Dell Precision T1500 desktop computer with a 22-inch monitor (30 cm x 48 
cm) was used to administer all instructions, questionnaires, and cognitive tasks. 
Participants were seated approximately 65 cm (~25”) from the monitor and responded to 
stimuli using a standard keyboard.  
Self-report Questionnaires 
 Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995).  Fear 
and avoidance of harm from spiders were measured using the FSQ. Using an 8-point 
Likert-type scale, participants rated the extent to which they agreed (0 = totally disagree, 
7 = totally agree) with 18 statements such as “If I saw a spider now, I would ask someone 
else to kill it.” The FSQ demonstrates excellent internal consistency (α = .92; Szymanski 
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& O’Donohue, 1995), test-retest reliability (r = .91), and good convergent and 
discriminant validity (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996).   
Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & 
Lang, 1974).  The SPQ is a 31-item true-false measure, which assesses cognitive and 
behavioural indices of spider fear such as “If someone says that there are spiders 
anywhere about, I become alert and edgy.”  The SPQ demonstrates excellent internal 
consistency (.95 < α < .97), test-retest reliability (r = .94), and differentiates between 
individuals with and without spider phobia (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993).  The BAI consists of 21 
items related to symptoms of anxiety (e.g., shaky, choking, terrified) experienced over 
the preceding week. The BAI is a frequently used measure of anxiety with well-
established psychometric properties (e.g., Osório, Crippa, & Loureiro, 2011).  
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI is 
a 21-item questionnaire that asks respondents to rate the degree to which they have 
experienced symptoms of depression (e.g., sadness, loss of pleasure, indecisiveness, 
changes in appetite) during the past two weeks. The BDI has well-established 
psychometric properties (Dozois & Covin, 2004).  
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958).  For the SUDS, 
respondents rate their level of state distress on a scale from 0 (no distress) to 100 
(extreme distress). These ratings have demonstrated correlations with physiological 
measures of stress (Thyer, Papsdorf, Davis, & Vallecorsa, 1984).  Similar to Ouimet et 
al., (2012), participants completed the original SUDS as well as 3 modified versions 
assessing feelings of happiness, frustration, and sleepiness. 
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Stimulus ratings.  Participants completed a measure designed for a previous 
study (Ouimet et al., 2012), for which they were asked to assess the subjective 
pleasantness and fear-relevance of all presented stimulus categories.  Participants were 
asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale the extent to which they found 2 random 
exemplars of each stimulus category (spider, butterfly, dragonfly, beetle; 8 items total) 
pleasant (0 = extremely unpleasant; 6 = extremely pleasant), how fearful they were of 
each stimulus (0 = no fear; 6 = terror), and how easily they were able to recognize each 
stimulus (0 = extremely unrecognizable; 6 = extremely recognizable). For all self-report 
questionnaires, internal consistency within the current sample is presented in Table 3.    
Cognitive Tasks 
Non-stereotypic association task (NSAT). The NSAT, modified from 
Gawronski et al. (2008), was designed to manipulate the activation of spider-fear 
associations in memory through two different methods of rule-based processing. 
Participants were asked either to repeatedly negate or to repeatedly reappraise the 
stereotypic emotional reaction to spiders. Specifically, they were asked to respond with a 
key-press to stimulus pairs of pictures (spiders or butterflies) and attributes (calm- or 
fear-related; see Figure 4). Participants were randomly assigned to either the reappraise 
(RA) or negate (NG) condition. Participants assigned to the RA condition were presented 
with the following instructions, modified from Gawronski et al. (2008; pp. 372): 
The following task is concerned with the emotional stereotypes 
associated with spiders and butterflies. As you probably know, people 
are often afraid of spiders, while they usually feel calm around 
butterflies. This reaction, however, is based on a stereotype that may 
or may not be true. In the following task, you will be presented with 
pictures of spiders and butterflies. In addition, you will be presented 
with words relating to fear and calmness that will appear on the screen 
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1500-4000 ms or until key-
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spacebar each time you see a SPIDER picture and a word relating to 
“CALM”, or a BUTTERFLY picture and a word relating to 
“AFRAID”. Please pay very close attention to combinations that are 
INCONSISTENT with the emotional stereotype of spiders and 
butterflies! For combinations that are consistent with the emotional 
stereotype of spiders and butterflies, you do not have to do anything. 
Again, please respond “YES!” with the spacebar each time you see a 
combination that is INCONSISTENT with the emotional stereotype of 
spiders and butterflies. Please try to respond as QUICKLY and as 
ACCURATELY as possible!” 
Participants in the NG condition received identical instructions, but were told to respond 
“NO!” by pressing the space bar in response to pairings that were consistent with 
emotional stereotypes.  
 Similar to Gawronski et al. (2008), participants were presented with 10 practice 
trials (5 each of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent, using the same stimuli as the 
critical trials) followed by 200 critical trials, composed of 50 trials for each of 4 types of 
stimulus-emotion pairings: (1) spider picture+calm-related word; (2) butterfly 
picture+calm-related word; (3) spider picture+fear-related word; (4) butterfly 
picture+fear-related word. For participants in the RA condition, correct responses 
consisted of spacebar presses (YES!) in response to types (1) and (4), and no response to 
types (2) and (3). Correct responses for participants in the NG condition were spacebar 
presses (NO!) to types (2) and (3), and no response to types (1) and (4). Stimulus pairings 
were created randomly by the software program Inquisit 3.0 (2009); every stimulus was 
presented once before any were repeated, and no exact stimulus pairing was repeated.  
 Each trial began with the presentation of a ‘bug’ picture centered in the top half of 
the screen. Following 500 ms, an emotional attribute was presented directly underneath 
the still present picture. For all trials, stimulus pairs were presented for a maximum of 
2,500 ms; spacebar presses resulted in the disappearance of the stimulus pairs. Feedback 
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was provided for all trials (250 ms). Correct responses were followed by a green “O” 
presented in the center of the screen; incorrect responses were followed by a red “X”. An 
interstimulus interval (ISI) of 1,000 ms following error/correct feedback was consistent 
across trials. Trials were presented in 5 blocks of 40 trials each, in between which 
participants were offered the chance to rest briefly.  
Stimuli. Pictorial stimuli included twenty 12 cm by 12 cm colour pictures each of 
spiders and butterflies.  Lexical stimuli consisted of 20 calm-related (e.g., relaxed, 
serene) and 20 fear-related words (e.g., terrified, scared) presented in white Arial font (all 
capital letters), sized to occupy 5% of the screen (1.5 cm in height).  All stimuli were 
piloted for recognizability, valence, and fear-relevance in a previous study (Ouimet et al., 
2012), and were presented on a black background. 
Visual search task (VST).  The VST, which assessed engagement with and 
disengagement from spiders, was identical to the paradigm described in Ouimet et al. 
(2012); a detailed description is provided therein. For all trials, participants were 
presented with a 4 x 4 matrix of 16 ‘bug’ pictures and were instructed to press a yes 
button on the keyboard if they detected a discrepant stimulus (i.e., odd-one-out) among 
15 categorically homogenous stimuli, or to press a no button on the keyboard if all the 
stimuli within a matrix belonged to the same bug category (i.e., spider, butterfly, beetle, 
or dragonfly). The task consisted of 130 trials: 24 engagement, 24 disengagement, 36 
control, 40 target absent, and 6 practice trials.  
For engagement trials (see Figure 2), the “odd-one-out” consisted of a spider 
target among a matrix of beetles, butterflies, or dragonflies. Disengagement trials 
consisted of either a beetle, butterfly, or dragonfly target among a matrix of spiders. 
64 
 
Control search trials included each possible variation of targets and distracters, other than 
those included in the engagement and disengagement trials. Target-absent trials were 
interspersed throughout the experiment to ensure that participants maintained careful 
responding.  
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. Participants were informed that the 
purpose of the study was to pilot new measures of cognitive processing. All further 
instructions, tasks, and questionnaires were presented via the computer using Inquisit 3.0 
Desktop experimental software (2009). 
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and pre-test SUDS ratings 
before beginning the cognitive tasks. Subsequently, they completed the NSAT, which 
was followed by a mandatory two-minute break in the testing room and SUDS ratings. 
Participants then completed the VST, followed by a break, and SUDS ratings. Finally, 
participants completed all symptom questionnaires on the computer, in a completely 
randomized order. Stimulus ratings were completed last.  
Results 
Data Preparation 
NSAT. To verify that participants in each condition successfully completed the 
manipulation, accuracy rates on the NSAT were examined. Frequency analyses indicated 
a bimodal distribution, wherein a small number of participants evidenced lower accuracy 
rates (< 78%). As such, all participants in the less accurate distribution were excluded (n 
= 4). The remaining 130 participants evidenced excellent accuracy rates (mean = 94.35%, 
SD = 4.87%, range = 79% – 100%). 
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VST. Following the exclusion of target absent trials, accuracy rates on the VST 
were examined. Similar to previous findings (Ouimet et al., 2012), a substantial portion 
of participants demonstrated poor accuracy across all trials of the VST (mean accuracy = 
83.06%, SD = 6.99%, Range = 61% - 90%). Moreover, accuracy rates differed 
significantly according to trial type, F(1.822, 234.982)3 = 71.61, p < .001. Participants 
were less accurate on spider-disengagement trials than on spider-engagement, t(258) =     
-6.00, and non-spider trials, t(258) = -12.78, and less accurate on engagement trials than 
on non-spider trials, t(258) = -6.13 (all p’s < .001). Therefore, as in Ouimet et al. (2012), 
both accuracy and reaction time data were included as outcome variables. Reaction time 
data was calculated only for trials on which participants correctly identified whether an 
odd-one-out was present in the matrix. 
To control for individual differences in speed and accuracy of responding, 
difference scores were calculated to obtain four bias indices: (1) Engagement speed 
(mean Engagement RT – mean Control RT), wherein positive scores reflect slowed, or 
reduced, engagement and negative scores reflect facilitated engagement; (2) 
Disengagement speed (mean Disengagement RT – mean Control RT), wherein positive 
scores reflect impaired disengagement, and negative scores reflect facilitated 
disengagement; (3) Engagement accuracy (Engagement accuracy – Control accuracy), 
wherein positive scores indicate higher accuracy and negative scores indicate lower 
accuracy), and (4) Disengagement accuracy, wherein positive scores indicate higher 
accuracy and negative scores indicate lower accuracy. Two Engagement speed index 
scores fell more than three standard deviations below the mean and one Disengagement 
                                                 
3 This analysis resulted in a violation of Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity, 2(2) = 13.20, p = 
.001; therefore, Greenhouse-Geiser tests are reported ( = .91). 
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speed index score fell more than three standard deviations above the mean; these 
participants were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 127 participants (64 RA, 63 
NG). One sample t-tests indicated that all four indices were significantly different from 0 
(absolute values of all t > 4.37, all p < .001). 
Sample Characteristics 
 Descriptive data for all attention and symptom-related variables are displayed in 
Table 3. Analyses indicated that there were no significant differences on any variables of 
interest according to age, sex, handedness, level of education, or mother tongue. 
Skewness and kurtosis were within acceptable limits for all measures.  
Attention Bias 
Although our original hypotheses were related to reaction times only, results 
indicating variable accuracy suggest that this is likely an important variable to assess as 
well. As such, two separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to examine 
the effects of our experimental manipulation on engagement and disengagement speed 
and accuracy. A 2 x 2 (Condition [NG, RA] x accuracy bias index [Engagement 
accuracy, Disengagement accuracy]) mixed model ANOVA demonstrated a significant 
main effect of bias index, F(1, 125) = 37.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. Specifically, participants 
evidenced greater engagement accuracy indices than disengagement accuracy indices. In 
other words, participants were more accurate when detecting spiders among homogenous 
distractors than when detecting bug targets among spider distractors. It is important to 
note, however, that both biases were negative, indicating that participants were most 




Descriptive data for all attention- and mood-related variables 
  Reappraise (n = 64)  Negate (n = 63) 
Variable α Mean (SD) Min. Max.  Mean (SD) Min. Max. 
VST Accuracy (%)         
Spider-engagement - 80.78 (10.36) 50.00 95.00  83.57 (9.52) 60.00 100.00 
Spider-disengagement - 75.39 (11.96) 40.00 95.00  75.48 (10.91) 50.00 95.00 
Non-spider control - 87.36 (7.72) 68.00 100.00  86.83 (7.17) 61.00 100.00 
VST Reaction times (ms) - - - -  - - - 
Spider-engagement .66 2219.10 (372.88) 1553.69 3225.27  2259.65 (377.68) 1573.31 3510.31 
Spider-disengagement .72 2309.78 (404.61) 1600.64 3158.00  2354.48 (408.96) 1135.09 3254.93 
Non-spider control .85 2116.38 (346.81) 1516.55 2783.92  2173.05 (361.86) 1576.15 3311.38 
VST Bias Indices - - - -  - - - 
Engagement accuracy (%) - -6.58 (9.35) -30.00 20.00  -3.26 (9.70) -24.00 20.00 
Disengagement accuracy (%) - -11.97 (11.21) -44.00 15.00  -11.36 (10.17) -32.00 18.00 
Engagement speed (ms) - 102.72 (246.76) -438.58 673.64  86.60 (243.19) -441.69 658.91 
Disengagement speed (ms) - 193.40 (238.98) -407.36 802.35  181.43 (272.85) -565.10 969.59 
BAI .89 10.98 (9.26) 0.00 40.00  12.76 (8.35) 1.00 36.00 
BDI .90 10.61 (8.27) 0.00 30.00  12.35 (9.04) 0.00 46.00 
FSQ .97 27.16 (30.09) 0.00 119.00  33.08 (35.43) 0.00 123.00 
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SPQ .91 9.45 (6.47) 0.00 26.00  10.67 (6.87) 1.00 26.00 
SUDS: Pre-test - 17.00 (21.94) 0.00 80.00  19.59 (24.56) 0.00 80.00 
SUDS: Post-NST - 16.11 (19.52) 0.00 70.00  19.41 (22.88) 0.00 85.00 
SUDS: Post-VST - 15.77 (19.65) 0.00 75.00  19.90 (22.35) 0.00 90.00 
VST = visual search task; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI  = Beck Depression Inventory; FSQ = Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; SPQ = Spider Phobia Questionnaire; SUDS = subjective units of 
distress scale, anxiety item.
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condition, F(1, 125) = 1.90, p = .17, ηp2 = .02, nor an interaction F(1, 125) = 1.51, p = 
.22, ηp2 = .01 (see Figure 5).  
A 2 x 2 (Condition [NG, RA] x RT bias index [Engagement speed, 
Disengagement speed]) mixed model ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
bias index, F(1, 125) = 11.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .09. Specifically, participants evidenced 
greater disengagement biases (i.e., slower RTs compared to controls) compared to 
engagement biases. It is important to note, however, that across conditions, participants 
demonstrated positive values for both bias indices, indicating a tendency to be slower on 
all trials where a spider was present (either as a target or a distractor). There was no 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 125) = 0.16, p = .69, ηp2 = .001, or interaction, 
F(1, 125) = 0.006, p = .94, ηp2 < .001 (see Figure 5).  
Symptom measures 
 Subjective mood data (SUDS) were collected at three time points for distress, 
sleepiness, happiness, and frustration, the latter three of which were assessed purely as 
filler questions. A 2 x 3 (Condition [NG, RA] x Time point [pre-test, post-NSAT, and 
post-VST]) mixed model ANOVA was conducted to examine changes in subjective 
distress. Results demonstrated a violation of Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity,  2(2) = 67.12, 
p < .001; therefore Greenhouse-Geiser tests are reported ( = .71) for the effects of time 
point.  No significant main effect of condition, F(1, 125) = .90, p = .35, ηp2 = .01, or time 
point emerged, F(1.41, 176.30) = .08, p = .85, ηp2 = .001, nor was there a significant 
interaction, F(1.41, 176.30) = .15, p = .78, ηp2 = .002. 
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Figure 5. Accuracy and reaction time Bias Indices on the Visual Search Task by 


























































Because the FSQ and SPQ are highly correlated and are assumed to measure 
similar constructs, a multivariate ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of the 
manipulation on self-reported spider fear and avoidance. Results demonstrated no 
significant difference in scores as a function of condition, F(2, 124) = .57, p = .57, ηp2 = 
.009. Two separate t-tests were conducted to examine whether our manipulation also 
affected other reports of mood and anxiety symptoms (BAI and BDI), thereby potentially 
reflecting an overall increase in negative affect. No significant differences emerged 
between conditions for the BAI, t(125) = -1.14, p = .26, or BDI, t(125) = -1.13, p = .26. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Correlations. To examine whether there was any relationship between the 
proposed mediator (attention bias) and subjective mood measures, a series of correlations 
was conducted. None of the four attention bias indices showed a significant relationship 
with self-report measures of spider fear and avoidance (FSQ, SPQ) or state distress 
(SUDS). However, Engagement accuracy was significantly correlated with BDI scores, r 
= -.27, p = .003, such that greater spider engagement accuracy was related to reduced 
depression severity. Moreover, Disengagement speed was significantly correlated with 
BAI scores, r = .19, p = .03, such that slower disengagement from spiders was related to 
increased anxiety severity. Given these findings, the ANOVAS described above were re-
conducted with BAI and BDI scores entered as covariates; no change in results emerged. 
Multiple Mediation Analyses 
 In contrast with previous literature comparing reaction times for different trial 
types, data from the current study evidenced significant variability in accuracy. As such, 
the extent to which observed reaction times represented a “pure” measure of attentional 
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disengagement was questionable. Therefore, to assess the main hypothesis, that repeated 
negation of spider-fear associations would predict impaired (slowed) disengagement, 
which would subsequently predict higher levels of reported spider fear, participants who 
were correct on fewer than 66.66%4 of trials on any single trial type were excluded (n = 
35). This exclusion and subsequent analyses were conducted in an exploratory fashion to 
attempt to strike an appropriate balance between obtaining the most “pure” measure of 
disengagement speed possible and retaining adequate power to observe any significant 
findings (exploratory n = 92, RA = 46, NG = 46).  
A multiple mediation model was conducted, using bootstrapping methods with 
5,000 samples, 95% confidence intervals, bias corrected and accelerated (INDIRECT 
Macro for SPSS Statistics, version 20.0; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Condition was entered 
as the independent variable, reaction time attention bias indices were entered as potential 
mediators (Engagement speed, Disengagement speed), and a composite spider fear 
variable obtained by taking the mean of standardized FSQ and SPQ scores was entered as 
the criterion variable. 
Condition did not emerge as a significant predictor of either potential mediator. 
Moreover, neither of the potential mediators was a significant predictor of the spider fear 
composite. Scores on the spider fear composite were significantly predicted by condition 
(unstandardized b = .46, SE = .19, t = 2.36, p = .020), wherein higher scores were 
                                                 
4 Because there was no precedent in the literature, an arbitrary value was chosen. Using a 
more inclusive cutoff point of 50% accuracy would mean including many participants 
who performed only at chance level (responses on the VST were either “yes” or “no”), 
thereby including a large amount of error. Using a more stringent cutoff point of 75% 
accuracy reduced our sample size to approximately 20 participants per condition, 
dramatically reducing experimental power. As such, 66.66% (or two thirds) accuracy was 
chosen to balance between these two limitations.  
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predicted by assignment to the NG condition. After accounting for effects of the potential 
mediators, the relationship between condition and reported spider fear remained largely 
unchanged (unstandardized b = .45, SE = .19, t = 2.31, p = .023).  Percentile confidence 
intervals (CIs) provided no evidence of mediation. Overall, there was a trend for the 
model to account for a small, but significant amount of variance in scores on the spider 
fear composite, R2 =.076, F(3, 88) = 2.39, p = .07, providing some limited support for the 
hypothesis that repeated negation, compared to repeated appraisal, may impact upon 
symptom reporting.  
Discussion 
The current study was designed as a preliminary test of the hypothesis that 
maladaptive rule-based processing contributes to threat-relevant attention bias, which 
subsequently predicts increased reported anxious psychopathology. Specifically, I 
investigated whether participants who repeatedly negated spider-fear associations would 
evidence impaired disengagement from spiders and subsequently, greater reported spider 
fear compared to participants who repeatedly reappraised spiders as safe or neutral. 
Results did not support hypotheses; however, several methodological limitations are 
noted below. The main significant finding that emerged was consistent with previous 
literature, in that participants were faster and more accurate when detecting spiders 
among homogeneous distractors than they were when detecting other bugs among an 
array of spiders.  
Interestingly, correlational relationships were observed between certain 
components of attention bias and more broad-based measures of psychopathology. 
Specifically, greater engagement accuracy was related to decreased depressive severity 
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on the BDI, and impaired disengagement was associated with greater anxiety severity on 
the BAI. These relationships were unaffected by condition. Although the relationship 
between anxiety and impaired disengagement is consistent with previous research, it is 
surprising, considering the observed lack of relationship between disengagement speed 
and spider fear/avoidance. It may be that individuals who tended to experience higher 
levels of anxiety had greater difficulty disengaging from threat, but were not spider 
fearful, per se. Moreover, because concentration can be impaired by symptoms of 
depression, it may be that individuals with decreased severity (or complete absence) of 
depression were better able to detect spiders among arrays of other bugs.  
Post-hoc exploratory analyses were conducted within a subsample selected for 
reasonable VST accuracy to account for some of the methodological limitations. Results 
within this subsample were partially consistent with hypotheses. Compared to repeated 
reappraisal, repeated negation resulted in higher levels of self-reported spider fear and 
avoidance. In contrast with previous research, attentional responding was unrelated to 
reported spider fear. Moreover, no evidence for mediation of the relationship between 
rule-based processing and spider fear by disengagement was observed. 
As discussed elsewhere (Ouimet et al., 2012), these findings may be related to the 
nature of the VST. Specifically, the VST may not provide a “pure” assessment of 
engagement or disengagement processes, but likely reflects a combination of cognitive 
processes including attention shifting, visual scanning, and cognitive speed. Moreover, 
observed low accuracy rates in the current study complicate measurement of reaction 
time. Indeed, reaction times in the current study were relatively long in comparison to 
most research investigating attention bias, suggesting more complex processing. For 
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example, detecting a dragonfly among a matrix of spiders may reflect both repeated 
facilitated engagement with spider distractors as well as difficulty disengaging from such 
stimuli. Future research in this area may benefit from the use of paradigms that more 
clearly differentiate among cognitive processes.  
It is particularly important to note that I used a nonclinical sample. Although I 
endeavoured to measure (and influence) attention bias among participants with a broad 
range of spider fear, research has demonstrated that attention biases are often not 
observed among non-anxious samples (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Olatunji, 
2010). As such, it is possible that the current sample was not fearful enough to detect 
differences in attention bias. However, non-anxious control groups often consist of 
participants selected for particularly low levels of fear, rather than individuals with 
normative levels of fear (e.g., Teachman, 2007). Moreover, with respect to specific 
phobias, although biases for spider stimuli tend to be more pronounced in spider fearful 
samples (e.g., Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Osinsky et al., 2008), attention biases for 
phylogenetically prepared fear-relevant stimuli such as spiders, snakes, and angry faces 
are typical of nonselected populations (see Ohman & Mineka, 2001, for a review) 
Finally, a recent meta-analysis demonstrated no significant difference in attention bias 
effect sizes between clinically diagnosed anxiety populations and populations of non-
clinical participants with high levels of self-reported anxiety (Bar-Haim et al.), 
suggesting that although a clinical sample may provide the greatest likelihood of 
observing attentional biases, a broad range of spider fear is useful for understanding 
individual differences in cognitive processing. Given the largely null findings of the 
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current study, however, future research examining the effects of negation and reappraisal 
on attention bias within a highly fearful sample is warranted. 
Indeed, the use of a non-clinical versus clinical sample may be particularly 
important considering previous research conducted using the NSAT. In a series of two 
studies, Gawronski et al. (2008) demonstrated that, compared to negation of stereotypic 
attitudes, affirmation of gender and race counterstereotypes (i.e., women-strong/men-
weak and Black-positive/White-negative) resulted in reduced activation of gender 
stereotypes and reduced automatic preference for Whites over Blacks, respectively. The 
original stereotypes that this training task was purported to activate/deactivate, however, 
have been demonstrated to occur robustly within the general population (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). For example, in a very large scale review compiling the results of over 2.5 
million IATs completed online, almost 70% of participants demonstrated stronger 
Black/dark skin-bad and White/light skin-good associations than for the reverse pairings  
(d = 0.77; Nosek et al., 2007). As such, the automatic attitudes and evaluations assessed 
by Gawronski et al. may have been more highly prevalent in their student sample than 
were the automatic spider-danger associations within the current study. For example, a 
sample of high spider fearful participants who completed the GNAT evidenced a mean 
GNAT D score (conceptually similar to Cohen’s d) of .26, which was significantly higher 
than scores obtained by a low spider fearful sample (GNAT D = -.03; Teachman, 2007). 
If indeed spider-fear (and butterfly-calm) associations are smaller in magnitude (or in 
prevalence) than gender or race stereotypes, it is possible that the spider NSAT used in 
the current study was less effective at activating/deactivating such associations, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that effects of the manipulation on attention bias and/or spider 
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fear would be observed.  In other words, associations can only be ironically activated 
through repeated negation to the extent that they are present and strong. As such, the 
NSAT as it was designed for the current study may be of use only within a clinical 
sample. 
The exploratory finding that repeated reappraisal led to lower levels of spider fear 
than did repeated negation is consistent with the core tenet of cognitive theory: that 
cognition leads to affect (Beck, 1967). Moreover, research on interpretive bias has 
consistently demonstrated a tendency to appraise ambiguous stimuli negatively (e.g., 
Salemink et al., 2010). The use of the NSAT in the current study may have provided 
important information about not only the nature of appraisal biases, but also the process 
by which they may develop or be maintained. It is possible that repeated negation (e.g., 
that spider is not dangerous) results in ironic endorsement of symptoms of 
psychopathology, compared to repeated “safe” reappraisal (albeit, with small effect 
sizes). This finding may partially explain research by Teachman and Addison (2008), 
which demonstrated that presumed “positive” training (e.g., the spider is harmless) was 
only partially effective at reducing symptoms of spider fear. The methodology employed 
by such training paradigms may activate and strengthen the relationship between 
concepts associated with harm and the stimulus at hand (Gawronski et al., 2008). What 
remains unclear from results of the current study is whether greater reported fear within 
the more accurate subsample of participants was a direct result of activated spider-fear 
associations, as suggested by the multi-process model of cognitive vulnerability to 
anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009). Future research that incorporates manipulation of rule-
based processing with pre- and post-manipulation measures of associative processing will 
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be integral to furthering our understanding of the interaction between these two systems. 
Moreover, because this finding emerged only within a severely limited sample, it would 
be particularly important to investigate whether it could be replicated with more 
appropriate tasks.  
Despite the preliminary nature of this study, the results may have interesting 
clinical implications. Currently, cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) is the treatment of 
choice for anxiety disorders (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; DiMauro, Domingues, 
Fernandez, & Tolin, 2013; S. G. Hofmann & Smits, 2008; Norton & Price, 2007; Stewart 
& Chambless, 2009; Tolin, 2010). My findings, however, suggest that it may be useful to 
pay attention to the language used during cognitive restructuring about the dangerousness 
of feared stimuli or situations. Specifically, although encouraging clients to evaluate 
spiders, social situations, or contaminated objects as “not dangerous” or “harmless” may 
lead to more adaptive reported beliefs, it may also serve to strengthen memorial links 
between such stimuli and fear-related concepts. This discrepancy between ‘explicit’ 
beliefs and ‘implicit’ associations may explain clinical observations of clients who 
believe a stimulus (e.g., snake) to be safe but still exhibit terror and avoidance upon its 
exposure. As such, it may be more clinically effective to foster the reappraisal of feared 
stimuli as safe or relatively neutral, thereby potentially weakening associative links and 





This project of research was designed to assess the usefulness of integrating dual-
systems accounts of cognitive functioning, developed within the social-cognitive 
literature, with cognitive theories of vulnerability to anxiety. In particular, I investigated 
the extent to which individual differences in information processing within the 
associative and rule-based systems could clarify discrepant findings in research related to 
attentional bias in spider fear. Because of the novel use of such models within the realm 
of clinical psychology (see Teachman, Cody, & Clerkin, 2010), these two studies 
represented preliminary tests of a multi-process model of cognitive vulnerability to 
anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009), and assessed separately the influences of spider-fear 
association strength and rule-based (in)validation (reappraisal vs. negation) on attention 
bias and reported spider fear. Particularly important to the theoretical model, attention 
bias was measured both in terms of engagement with and disengagement from spiders, 
allowing for a better understanding of the stages of attention that may be influenced 
differentially by dual-systems processing.  
Summary of Findings 
 Study 1. In this study, unselected undergraduate participants completed measures 
of strength of spider-fear associations (compared to spider-calm associations), attentional 
engagement with and disengagement from spiders (in terms of both accuracy and speed), 
and overt reports of spider fear and avoidance. Although previous research has 
investigated relationships among some of these variables (Teachman, 2007; Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2011a, 2011b), this study was designed specifically to test the 
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hypothesis that stronger spider-fear associations would predict impaired disengagement 
from spider stimuli, which would subsequently predict elevated levels of spider fear. 
 Results were partially consistent with hypotheses. In contrast with prior research, 
participants evidenced significant differences in accuracy across attention measures. 
Specifically, participants were least accurate on trials where they were required to 
disengage from 15 spiders to find a ‘bug’ target, and most accurate on trials where they 
were required to find a spider among 15 homogenous ‘bug’ distractors. Participants were 
also slowest on disengagement trials and fastest on engagement trials. Moreover, 
correlations demonstrated that stronger spider-fear associations were associated with 
reduced disengagement accuracy, and higher reported spider fear was associated with 
faster performance on both engagement and disengagement trials.  
 With respect to the main hypothesis of interest, an indirect relationship between 
stronger spider-fear associative links and higher levels of reported spider fear emerged 
via reduced disengagement accuracy only. Thus, although disengagement speed was 
unrelated to the relationship between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ spider fear, disengagement 
accuracy proved important. To my knowledge, this is the first study to show that 
individual differences in associative processing can predict cognitive bias and subsequent 
reported anxiety. Moreover, the results highlight the importance of using methodologies 
which assess separately (but within the same study) the multiple components of attention, 
including orientation, engagement, disengagement, speed, and accuracy. 
It is important to note that as is typical of studies assessing attention, effect sizes 
within study 1 were modest. This finding likely reflects first, the subtlety of effects that 
are observed when using accuracy and reaction time data, and second, that mental health 
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problems are rarely, if ever, caused by a single factor. Study 2 was designed to 
investigate the influence of rule-based processing on attention bias and subsequent 
reported spider fear.   
 Study 2. For this study, participants were randomly assigned into either the 
reappraise (RA) or negate (NG) conditions, wherein they repeatedly reappraised spiders 
as calm-related or repeatedly negated the anxiety-relevance of spiders, respectively. 
Subsequently, they completed computerized measures of attentional engagement and 
disengagement, as well as questionnaires assessing their level of spider fear. Again, 
reduced accuracy on the VST was noted. Overall, participants were slower on 
disengagement trials than on engagement trials. This effect, however, was not moderated 
by condition. Indeed, there was no main effect of condition on either attention bias or 
reported spider fear. Moreover, attentional responding was unrelated to reported spider 
fear. Because of the variability of accuracy rates on the VST, exploratory analyses were 
conducted for a subsample of participants who evidenced reasonable error rates on this 
task. Within this subsample, bootstrapped multiple mediation analyses demonstrated that 
greater levels of spider fear and avoidance were predicted by assignment to the NG 
condition (in contrast to the RA condition), providing some support for the hypothesis 
that repeated negation may result in ironic increases in fear. Contrary to hypotheses, the 
relationship between condition and reported spider fear was not mediated by attention 
bias.  
Theoretical Implications 
The multi-systems model of vulnerability to anxiety disorders (Ouimet et al., 
2009) tested in the current studies represents an attempt to explain not only divergent 
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findings related to threat-relevant attention bias, but also common clinical experiences 
whereby the explicit beliefs of treatment-seeking clients are inconsistent with their 
behaviour and affective reactions. Spider fearful individuals may explain that they 
“know” the spider in the cage on their therapist’s desk cannot harm them, but that they 
still “feel” terrified that it may somehow escape and kill them. Similarly, although people 
with generalized anxiety disorder may acknowledge that the likelihood of their plane 
crashing is infinitesimally low5, the lack of 100% certainty of surviving the flight results 
in family vacations only to destinations within driving distance. Indeed, the distinctions 
between two processing systems (automatic vs. controlled, implicit vs. explicit, knowing 
vs. feeling, etc.), and their effects on pathological behaviour have received considerable 
attention in recent years. As emphasized by Roefs et al. (2011), measurement of implicit 
constructs are useful only to the extent that they provide information beyond that of self-
report instruments. The current studies provide some support for the incremental 
usefulness of such measurement in understanding attention bias and vulnerability to 
anxiety.  
The findings from Study 1, that strong spider-fear associations predicted elevated 
levels of self-reported spider fear/avoidance, and moreover, that this was an indirect 
relationship via reduced disengagement accuracy has several implications. The 
magnitude of the relationship between associative strength and spider fear was modest 
(.15 - .20). Although this finding at first glance may appear to disconfirm the construct 
                                                 
5 According to the OAG Aviation and PlaneCrashInfo.com Accident Database (20 years 
of data, 1993-2012), the likelihood of being killed on a single airline flight administered 
through 1 of the 78 major airlines is 1 in 4.7 million (or .0000213%). This likelihood 
drops considerably, to 1 in 19.8 million (or .00000505%), when considering the 39 world 
airlines with the best accident rates. 
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validity of the GNAT, it is consistent with a large body of research demonstrating that 
indirect and direct measures of a particular construct provide distinct but related 
outcomes (Nosek & Smyth, 2007).  Indeed, a recent review reported that correlations 
between indirect and direct measures of specific phobia fall within a wide range (-.21 - 
.67), with studies using more theoretically relevant constructs (i.e., spider-danger vs. 
spider-negative) and reduced method invariance (i.e., measuring spider-danger on both 
measures) evidencing the strongest effects (Roefs et al., 2011). Results from Study 1, 
therefore, extend extant research by providing support for the contention that other 
cognitive processes may mediate (and potentially moderate, though not tested here) the 
relationship between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ beliefs. Indeed, the extent to which 
individuals were able to accurately disengage from spider pictures accounted for much of 
the variance in the relationship between spider-fear associations and reported spider 
fear/avoidance.  Moreover, the differential relationships between attention bias and direct 
and indirect measures of fear lend further support to the contention that measurement of 
both types of beliefs is important to understanding the development and maintenance of 
anxious pathology.  
Although associative strength was not measured in Study 2, both studies assessed 
the relationship between self-reported spider fear and attentional responding on the VST. 
In Study 1, results were surprising; higher self-reported spider fear was related to faster 
engagement and disengagement. In Study 2, no relationship between attention bias and 
spider fear was observed. For both studies, results are inconsistent with previous 
research. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the VST may not measure attention bias, per 
se. Although the VST was chosen because of its potential to assess individual differences 
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in time-course of responding to threat rather than group differences at arbitrarily chosen 
presentation durations, it may instead measure efficient and uncontrollable processing of 
threat-relevant material (Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012), two of four 
separable components (unconsciousness, efficiency, unintentionality, uncontrollability) 
believed to contribute to automaticity (Bargh, 1994). To the extent that an individual 
accurately and quickly detects a spider among neutral distractors (i.e., engagement trial), 
processing of threat is efficient; to the extent that an individual struggles to detect a 
neutral target (e.g., dragonfly) among spider distractors (i.e., disengagement trial), 
processing of threat is uncontrollable or unstoppable, regardless of intention (McNally, 
1995; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Teachman et al., 2012). As such, although the 
engagement and disengagement trials of the current study were designed to measure 
different phases of a presumed continuous attentional process, they may actually have 
measured separable automatic processing characteristics, which do not always co-vary 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  
These studies highlighted the importance of considering the complexity of 
cognitive processes, particularly when assessing biases. According to Ouimet et al. 
(2009), the phases of attention are characterized by different components of 
automaticity/strategy. Specifically, orientation may be unconscious and unintentional, but 
not capacity-free/efficient; engagement may be conscious and controllable, but 
unintentional and inefficient; and avoidance may be conscious, intentional, controllable, 
and inefficient6. Disengagement, rather than a conceptually distinct stage of attention, is 
                                                 
6 Although these characteristics combined suggest that avoidance is almost a completely 
strategic decision, it is also possible to develop a more “automatic” avoid behavioural 
schema, which would be linked to the stimulus in the associative system. 
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considered the result of the interplay between the behavioural schemata activated through 
the associative system and the behavioural decision(s) provided by the rule-based system. 
Impaired disengagement, therefore, is posited to occur when the responses of these 
systems conflict. In considering a disengagement trial on the current version of the VST, 
an individual searching for a neutral odd-one-out will fixate on one stimulus at the time, 
with the goal of deciding whether it is the target. With each fixation, inputs from the 
associative and rule-based systems are believed to impact how quickly and/or accurately 
an individual is able to move from one stimulus to the next. If, however, as contended by 
Teachman et al. (2012), such a trial is a measure of (un)controllability more than 
attention, per se, the current studies may have provided a good test of relationships 
between different characteristics of automaticity/strategy, but not necessarily attentional 
engagement and disengagement. Future research should endeavour to measure specific 
aspects of cognition (e.g., associative strength) while capturing attentional processes in 
the most ecologically valid way possible.  
Indeed, information processing models of attention in anxiety posit that highly 
anxious individuals actually avoid threatening stimuli at later stages of attention (e.g., 
Koster et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 2004; Rinck & Becker, 2006). The multi-systems 
model proposes that attentional avoidance is considered the result of adaptive rule-based 
processes, whereby the stimuli are reappraised as safe, disengagement occurs, and 
anxiety (if triggered initially) dissipates (Ouimet et al., 2009). Support for this model, 
therefore, would come from earlier and sustained attentional disengagement and 
avoidance of threatening stimuli by less anxious participants, which is counterintuitive 
from a cognitive perspective. Indeed, most cognitive models of anxiety contend that 
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avoidance of threat functions as a safety-seeking behaviour that perpetuates faulty beliefs 
about the stimulus itself, the individual’s ability to cope, and the processes by which 
anxiety attenuates (see Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010, for a recent discussion). 
It is important, however, to distinguish between attentional and behavioural 
avoidance. Cognitive models generally focus on behavioural avoidance, whereas 
information processing research typically measures attentional avoidance. Although 
attentional allocation is certainly a behaviour in its own right, it differs conceptually from 
behavioural avoidance, such as leaving a room where a spider is present, using complex 
driving routes to avoid bridges, or going to parties only in the company of one’s 
significant other. Indeed, attentional engagement and behavioural avoidance may at times 
serve the same purpose. For example, a spider phobic individual who notices a spider in 
the room will likely maintain his/her focus (i.e., attentional engagement) on the spider to 
ensure that it doesn’t move closer, thereby guaranteeing safety; similarly, (s)he may 
escape the room (i.e., behavioural avoidance) to achieve the same result. Attention bias 
studies typically measure the extent to which individuals engage, disengage, or avoid 
static images on a computer screen. Eventual avoidance of such images (as posited by 
vigilance-avoidance models), which may elicit anxiety but cannot possibly attack the 
participant, likely results in attenuation of anxiety, whereas attentional avoidance of 
actual spiders in the environment likely increases anxiety. Findings from the current 
studies are consistent with previous research, in that participants were slower to 
disengage from spiders than they were to detect spiders. Interestingly, in Study 1, 
individuals with higher self-reported spider fear actually disengaged more quickly from 
spiders. In other words, they exhibited earlier attentional avoidance.  In fact, this finding 
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may be consistent with vigilance-avoidance models, in that they detected the spiders in 
the array more quickly, thereby initiating the “avoid” sequence earlier, and ultimately 
demonstrating shorter reaction times. It is important to consider the possibility that 
information processing research may not accurately capture the processes that occur in 
the presence of real, rather than simulated threat. 
As such, research designed to assess attention bias to real spiders may provide a 
more ecologically valid observation of such processes. However, as pointed out by 
Rinck, Kwakkenbos, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Becker (2010), it is impossible to standardize 
spider activity, which leads to a particularly important confound. In response to this 
limitation, Rinck et al. measured attention, approach, and avoidance of dirt spots and 
moving and non-moving spiders in an immersed virtual art museum. Compared to non-
fearful participants, spider fearful participants kept the virtual spiders in view for longer 
periods of time (attentional engagement), while maintaining a greater physical distance 
from them (behavioural avoidance) (Rinck et al., 2010). This study supports the 
contention that behavioural avoidance is characteristic of anxiety, but contradicts 
previous findings related to attentional avoidance. It seems instead that spider fearful 
individuals will remain engaged with spiders that move or threaten to move, likely to 
ensure continued safety. This finding highlights the importance of constructing 
ecologically valid observational and experimental paradigms to assess for cognitive bias. 
Although the current studies endeavoured to utilize highly threatening pictures, the model 
they were designed to test may necessitate experimental paradigms that more closely 




 Although the findings from the current program of research were modest, they 
present some interesting ideas for potentially improving upon extant efficacious 
psychological treatments for anxiety disorders, such as cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT). Several reviews and meta-analyses have confirmed the efficacy and effectiveness 
of CBT for anxiety disorders (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Norton & Price, 
2007; Stewart & Chambless, 2009; Tolin, 2010); however, a portion of patients either 
remain unwell or relapse following treatment. To better understand how CBT contributes 
to symptom change (and, consequently, why it is less effective for some participants), 
researchers have begun to focus on mechanisms of change, particularly those related to 
cognitive bias (e.g., Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 2002; Rapee, Gaston, & 
Abbott, 2009; Teachman, Marker, & Clerkin, 2010).  
 The findings from the current studies suggest that cognitive biases at multiple 
levels likely impact upon affective and behavioural symptoms. Moreover, it appears that 
different facets of attention bias, namely accuracy and speed, are distinctly related to 
indirect (i.e., associative) and direct (i.e., self-report) measures of spider fear. Together 
with findings from extant research which demonstrate that ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ fear 
make distinct contributions to behavioural avoidance, physiological fear responses, and 
anxiety symptoms (see Roefs et al., 2011, for a review), results from the current program 
of research suggest that therapeutic interventions which target overt beliefs as well as 
fear-relevant associative processes may provide even better outcomes. Indeed, the 
indirect relationship observed in Study 1 suggests that symptom improvement could 
potentially be achieved either by weakening spider-fear associations or by improving 
disengagement accuracy.  
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Whereas a growing, yet controversial, body of research supports the efficacy of 
cognitive bias modification (CBM) in the treatment of anxiety disorders (see Beard, 
2011; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011), research aimed at modifying clinically relevant 
associations is limited and has provided mixed results (e.g., Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 
2012; Clerkin & Teachman, 2010; Green & Teachman, 2012; Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, 
Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Although Study 2 did not measure change in associative 
strength directly, it was designed to activate extant spider-fear associations (in the NG 
condition only). This manipulation, however, had no effect on attention, and exerted 
small effects on spider fear/avoidance only within a severely restricted subsample of 
participants. Whereas these findings, in tandem with other studies that have produced null 
results (Teachman, Marker, & Smith-Janik, 2008) may indicate that activating/modifying 
such associations is difficult and/or has limited effects on clinical correlates, it is also 
important to remember that such paradigms are novel within psychopathological 
research. As such, continued research into methodologies that effectively measure such 
processes may also lead to increased ability to modify them, with the goal of decreasing 
symptoms.  
Finally, fear-relevant associations can likely be modified without the use of 
experimental paradigms designed for this purpose. Indeed, one of the goals of cognitive 
therapy for anxiety is to alter maladaptive schemata, which broadly speaking comprise a 
series of interconnected fear-relevant associations (Dobson & Dobson, 2009; Foa, 
Huppert, & Cahill, 2006; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). Particularly relevant to the 
current program of research are two recent studies which demonstrated changes in fear 
associations following CBT for individuals with GAD (Reinecke, Rinck, Becker, & 
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Hoyer, 2013) and panic disorder (Teachman et al., 2008). Moreover, both studies showed 
evidence for fear associations to predict trajectories of change. Among individuals 
receiving CBT for panic disorder, change in self-panic associations predicted subsequent 
change in panic symptom severity; however, the reverse relationship was not observed 
(Teachman et al., 2008). Among individuals receiving CBT for GAD, stronger 
associative biases were linked with delayed response to treatment and reduced change in 
intrusive thoughts compared to those with weaker associative biases (Reinecke et al., 
2013). Both CBT protocols included elements of psychoeducation, relaxation training, 
cognitive restructuring, and exposure. What remains unclear from these studies is what 
effected change in associations and how this was accomplished. It may be that exposure 
weakened associations between the self- and panicky in panic clients (neutral worry-
negative in GAD clients), and created/strengthened associations between self- and calm 
(neutral worry-positive). Alternatively (or additionally) sustained change in overt beliefs 
via cognitive restructuring may have resulted in “automatized” associations between 
physiological sensations (or worry domains) and insignificance. Moreover, it may be that 
certain individuals achieve such changes via distinct therapeutic interventions. Future 
research which examines what components of therapy produce changes in which 
cognitive biases may enable the refinement of existing effective therapies to adequately 
target the maintaining mechanisms for each individual, and ultimately provide enhanced 
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Consent Form (Identical for both studies) 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Allison J. 
Ouimet under the supervision of Dr. Adam S. Radomsky of the Fear and Anxiety Disorders 
Laboratory in the Psychology Department of Concordia University, whom I can contact:  
 
By phone: 514-848-2424 ext.5965  
By email: aj_ouime@live.concordia.ca  
 
A. PURPOSE  
 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to test new measures of basic thinking 
processes in order to better understand how the brain understands information.  
 
B. PROCEDURES  
 
I am aware that all parts of this experiment will take place right here in the lab. I will be asked to 
complete a series of questionnaires on the computer, complete some computer tasks involving 
pressing a button in response to images presented on the screen, and undergo a brief test of 
general memory. I will be given breaks in between trials to rest my eyes, and the entire study 
should take approximately 60 minutes.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS  
 
I understand that there are no major risks associated with this study, although there is the 
possibility of minor mental fatigue and eyestrain occurring while performing the computer tasks. 
I will be compensated for my time with one (1) participant pool credits, or one (1) entry into the 
annual cash prize draw.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION  
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at 
anytime without negative consequences.  
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e., the researcher will 
know, but will not disclose my identity). 
I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.  
 
NAME (please print)________________________________________  
 
__________________________________________________________  




Computerized GNAT Instructions (Study 1) 
Afraid Only Trials: 
 
In the following section you will see a black screen with the word AFRAID in the top 
right corner. Your task is to press the SPACEBAR when a word that fits into the category 
of AFRAID appears, and to press NOTHING if any other words or images appear. If you 
answer correctly, a green O will replace the item in the centre of the screen, if you answer 
incorrectly, a red X will appear. The next trial begins immediately after the O or X 
disappears, so please stay alert! You must answer as QUICKLY as possible while 
maintaining good ACCURACY. When you are ready to continue please press the 
ENTER key.  Good luck, and have fun! 
 
Spider Only Trials: 
In the following section you will see a black screen with the word SPIDER in the top left 
corner. Your task is to press the SPACEBAR when an image of a SPIDER appears, and 
to press NOTHING if any other words or images appear. If you answer correctly, a green 
O will replace the item in the centre of the screen, if you answer incorrectly, a red X will 
appear. The next trial begins immediately after the O or X disappears, so please stay 
alert! You must answer as QUICKLY as possible while maintaining good ACCURACY. 
When you are ready to continue please press the ENTER key.  Good luck, and have fun! 
 
Calm Only Trials: 
In the following section you will see a black screen with the word CALM in the top right 
corner. Your task is to press the SPACEBAR when a word that fits into the category of 
CALM appears, and to press NOTHING if any other words or images appear. If you 
answer correctly, a green O will replace the item in the centre of the screen, if you answer 
incorrectly, a red X will appear. The next trial begins immediately after the O or X 
disappears, so please stay alert. You must answer as QUICKLY as possible while 
maintaining good ACCURACY. When you are ready to continue please press the 
ENTER key. Good luck, and have fun! 
 
Spider + Calm Critical Trials: 
In the following section you will see a black screen with the word SPIDER in the top left 
corner and the word CALM in the top right corner. Your task is to press the SPACEBAR 
when EITHER a WORD that fits into the category of CALM appears OR a picture of a 
SPIDER appears, and to press NOTHING if any other words or images appear. If you 
answer correctly, a green O will replace the object in the centre of the screen, if you 
answer incorrectly, a red X will appear. The next trial begins immediately after the O or 
X disappears, so please stay alert! You must answer as QUICKLY as possible while 
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maintaining good ACCURACY. When you are ready to continue please press the 
ENTER key. Good luck, and have fun! 
 
Spider + Afraid Critical Trials: 
In the following section you will see a black screen with the word SPIDER in the top left 
corner and the word AFRAID in the top right corner. Your task is to press the 
SPACEBAR when EITHER a WORD that fits into the category of AFRAID appears OR 
a picture of a SPIDER appears, and to press NOTHING if any other words or images 
appear. If you answer correctly, a green O will replace the item in the centre of the 
screen, if you answer incorrectly, a red X will appear. The next trial begins immediately 
after the O or X disappears, so please stay alert. You must answer as QUICKLY as 
possible while maintaining good ACCURACY. When you are ready to continue please 




Computerized VST Instructions (Studies 1 and 2) 
Practice Trials: 
 
Welcome to the Visual Search Task! This task may remind you of a game you played as 
a child: One of these things just doesn't belong here! 
 
In this section, you will see a matrix of 16 animal pictures on each trial. There are four 
different categories of animals: BEETLES, BUTTERFLIES, DRAGONFLIES, and 
SPIDERS. 
 
On some trials, all of the animals will come from the same animal category. On others, 
you may see an ODD-ONE-OUT. 
 
In other words, there may be one picture (e.g., BEETLE) that belongs to a different 
animal category than the other 15 pictures (e.g., BUTTERFLIES). Your job is to press 
the "YES" key if there is an ODD-ONE-OUT and to press the "NO" key if all of the 
pictures come from the same category (e.g., all dragonflies). 
 
If you answer correctly, a green O will appear in the centre of the screen. If you answer 
incorrectly, OR if you don't answer before the time limit, a red X will appear. The next 
trial begins immediately after the O or X disappears, so please stay alert! 
 
It is very important to answer as QUICKLY as possible while maintaining good 





Great job! You will now start the "test" portion of this task. If you have any questions 
about the task, please ask the experimenter now. 
 
Again, your job is to press the "YES" key if there is an ODD-ONE-OUT and to press the 
"NO" key if all of the pictures come from the same animal category. 
 
If you answer correctly, a green O will appear in the centre of the screen. if you answer 
incorrectly, OR if you don't answer before the time limit, a red X will appear. The next 
trial begins immediately after the O or X disappears, so please stay alert! 
 
It is very important to answer as QUICKLY as possible while maintaining good 



























Average # of characters = 6.5 Average # of characters = 6.4 
Average # of syllables = 2.15 Average # of syllables = 2.05 
Median Frequency = 32.57 Median Frequency = 22 
*First 16 words only used for GNAT 
                                                 
























Note: Superscript letter indicates task for which picture category was used. a  = GNAT; b 
= VST; c = NSAT 
 
  
